The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation by Bittker, Boris I & Rahdert, George K
The Yale Law Journal
Volume 85, Number 3, January 1976
The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations
from Federal Income Taxation'
Boris I. Bittkert and George K. Rahdertff
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 301
I. The Tax Status of "Public Service" Organizations 307
A. Measuring the "Income" of Public Service Organizations 307
B. The Appropriate Tax Rate for Public Service
Organizations 314
C. The Legislative Retreat from Complete Tax Exemption 316
1. The Tax on "Unrelated Business Income" 316
2. The Investment Income and Capital Gains of Private
Foundations 326
3. The 1975 Tax on "Political Organization Taxable
Income" 328
II. The Tax Status of Public Service Organizations-Some Spe-
cific Problems 330
A. Charitable Organizations 330
B. Educational Institutions 333
C. Scientific Organizations 335
D. "Public" and "Private" Charities-"Private Foundations" 336
* The authors are indebted to Alan Wilensky, J.D. 1972, Yale University, for research
in connection with the first draft of this article.
t Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University.
t J.D. 1975, Yale University.
299
HeinOnline -- 85 Yale. L.J. 299 1975-1976
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 85: 299, 1976
E. Religious Organizations 342
F. Social Welfare Organizations 345
III. Mutual Benefit Organizations 348
A. Social Clubs 349
B. Consumers' Cooperatives and Similar Organizations 351
C. Labor Unions 353
D. Business Leagues 355
Conclusion 357
HeinOnline -- 85 Yale. L.J. 300 1975-1976
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Introduction
The practice of exempting charitable and religious organizations,
mutual benefit groups, and a variety of other nonprofit associations
from federal income taxation has persisted, with surprising consis-
tency despite minor variations in coverage, for many years. With roots
reaching back to the British Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601 and to
early state constitutional provisions,' most of today's exemptions from
income taxation date from the Revenue Act of 18942 and were re-
enacted in the corporation income tax of 19093 and the Revenue Act
of 1913. 4 But neither upon their initial enactment nor during the
ensuing decades have these exemptions elicited more than cursory
legislative explanation, save for matters of technical detail. Commen-
tators have been almost equally silent.5 These decades of benign ne-
glect may have reflected a conviction that the wisdom of tax exemp-
tion was self-evident, that the basic policy was politically invulnerable
to change, or that taxation in this area would bring in little revenue.
But there have been several departures from this legislative tolerance
in recent years.6 This change in attitude, in our view, amply warrants
a re-examination of a policy long accepted almost without question.
Although it is common practice (as in the title of this article) to
refer to the tax exemption enjoyed by "nonprofit organizations," the
Internal Revenue Code 7 exempts a wider range of groups than the
1. See generally Reiling, Federal Taxation: What Is a Charitable Organization?, 44
A.B.A.J. 525, 526 (1958); 50 CONG. REC. 1306 (1913) (discussion of state constitutional
exemptions of scientific and benevolent organizations from property taxation).
2. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556. There was an earlier recognition
of exemption for "literary, scientific, or other charitable institutions" by the Internal
Revenue Service. G. BouTvELL, A MANUAL OF THE DIREcT AND ExcisE TAX SYSTEM OF
THE UNITED STATES 275 (1863).
3. Act of Aug. 9, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112.
4. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 2(G), 38 Stat. 172.
5. See generally Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charities and Other Exempt Organi-
zations: The Need for a National Policy, 1968 U. So. CAL. T.Ax INsT. 27, 28-30 & nn.3-7
(contains extensive bibliographies and is one of the few articles to concern itself with
basic issues rather than details).
6. The imposition of a tax on the unrelated business income of many charities by
the Revenue Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 906, see pp. 320-22 infra, was the first of these inroads.
It was followed by the special tax and other constraints imposed in 1969 on private
foundations, INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4940-4948, see p. 326 infra, and the imposition
in 1975 of a tax on political organizations, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 527, see pp.
328-29 infra.
7. Current provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C., will hereinafter be cited
by section number only.
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"nonprofit" label implies. The best known exempt organizations-
charitable institutions, schools, colleges, churches and the like-serve
the interests of society in a broad sense, ordinarily without economic
benefit to their organizers or benefactors. But many other exempt or-
ganizations (such as chambers of commerce, consumer cooperative
societies, and labor unions) are operated primarily for the economic
benefit of their members; they are "nonprofit" groups only in the
limited sense that they do not engage in business with the general
public for the benefit of investors.8 Moreover, there are differences
in tax treatment under the Code within the broad category of "exempt
organizations." A few are exempt regardless of the nature of their
income; others lose their exempt status on receiving income from
proscribed sources; most are taxed on their "unrelated business in-
come" and some on "passive" investment income as well; some but
not all lose their exemption if they engage in specified political ac-
tivity; some qualify only if they were organized before a specific
date; and there are numerous other distinctions among the many
subspecies of exempt organizations listed in § 501(c) and other sec-
tions of the Code.
In the early days of the federal income tax, however, all nonprofit
organizations were lumped together and exempted from tax as though
fungible members of an undifferentiated mass. Congress enunciated
no developed theory for this practice. But in a groping way the few
lawmakers who commented on the issue suggested that an income
tax could appropriately be imposed only on activities conducted for
profit, and that crucial statutory notions like "net income" and "busi-
ness expenses" do not ring true when applied to nonprofit organiza-
tions. The Revenue Act of 1894 imposed a two percent corporate
tax on "net profits or income above actual operating and business
expenses ... of all ... corporations, companies, or associations doing
business for profit . . ... - Perhaps because the distinction between
profitmaking corporations and nonprofit institutions was thought ob-
vious, Congress devoted little discussion to a separate section of the
Act exempting various charitable, religious, educational, and fraternal
benefit organizations from income taxation. The most extensive re-
corded debate was provoked by the exemption of mutual life insurance
companies, which was successfully defended on the ground that these
8. See note 15 infra.
9. See note 2 supra.
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companies are not "conducted as a business for gain," and are there-
fore inappropriate subjects for income taxation.10
Shortly after ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, Representa-
tive Cordell Hull, author of the Revenue Act of 1913, argued in Con-
gress against an explicit expansion of its exemption clauses to embrace
"benevolent" and "scientific" organizations, on the ground that the
statutory reference to "net income" automatically excluded all non-
profit organizations:
Mr. Chairman, I simply desire to say . . . that this bill contains
the usual language exempting all corporations of the different
kinds mentioned and indicated in the exemption clause. Of course
any kind of society or corporation that is not doing business for
profit and not acquiring profit would not come within the mean-
ing of the taxing clause of paragraph G [taxing the "entire net
income" of every corporation, joint-stock company or association].
So I see no occasion whatever for undertaking to particularize
.... I think the better way is to follow the exemption clause that
has been well defined and understood heretofore without any
particular objection."
In administering the new law, however, the Treasury was inclined
to treat the particularized list of exempt organizations as exclusive
rather than to interpret the statutory reference to "net income" as
conferring blanket exemption on all nonprofit organizations. Congress
responded by expanding the exemption clauses when enacting the
Revenue Act of 1916.12 Although in subsequent years nonprofit or-
ganizations that could not bring themselves within an explicit exemp-
tion did not ordinarily claim that they were implicitly exempted by
the statutory references to "income," there are occasional echoes of
this broader rationale for exempting such groups. The tax status of
political parties, for example, was not prescribed by statute until 1975,
but they had not previously filed tax returns, in part no doubt be-
10. 26 CONG. REc. 6623 (1894) (remarks of Sen. Hill). The same rationale was applied
to exemptions from the excise tax on corporations imposed by the Revenue Act of 1909.
See 44 CONG. REc. 393 (1909) (remarks of Sen. Aldrich, Finance Committee Chairman,
who proposed the corporate excise tax).
11. 50 CONG. Rac. 1306 (1913). See also 44 CONG. REc. 3937-39 (1909) (fraternal bene-
ficiary societies and building and loan ("homestead") associations implicitly exempted if
not operated for profit).
12. H.R. RFP. No. 64-922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1916):
It was deemed advisable to specifically extend the exemption to other corporations
similar to those enumerated in the present law as exempt from tax in view of the
fact that the experience of the Treasury Department has been that the securing of
returns from them has been a source of expense and annoyance and has resulted
in the collection of either no tax or an amount which is practically negligible.
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cause the concept of "income" seemed ill-adapted to their objectives,
receipts, and activities. 13
It is not surprising that the early legislative history of the tax ex-
emption reveals no systematic analysis. The focus of Congress was (in-
deed, still is) on profitmaking organizations, investors, and wage earn-
ers, not on charities, churches, fraternal societies, labor unions, and
other nonprofit groups which could be, at most, marginal targets for
the tax collector. No wonder it was not thought necessary or worth-
while to disentangle the various, sometimes inconsistent, strains of
thought in the legislative discussion of the tax exemption of nonprofit
organizations. At different times and in different contexts, Congress
has rested income tax exemption on a number of distinct rationales:
a lack of fit between the concept of "income" and the objectives of
nonprofit organizations; their meager potential as sources of revenue;
the nuisance of recordkeeping for groups that often operate informally
and rely heavily on voluntary services; and the praiseworthy benevo-
lent spirit animating such groups.
In retrospect, however, we are struck not so much by the rudimen-
tary state of the early analysis, though rudimentary it surely was, as
by the legislative perception, however groping, that nonprofit organiza-
tions are not suitable targets for an income tax. In our view, for
reasons that will be developed at some length in this article, this
was a sound judgment deserving more attention and respect than it
has received from tax scholars. Moreover, we believe that it is sounder
both in theory and as a basis for legislative action than the competing
view that statutory exemptions for nonprofit organizations constitute
loopholes in a "normal" tax structure or special privileges requiring
affirmative justification. 14
13. See note 70 infra.
14. Using language that is strikingly similar to recent discussions of "tax expendi-
tures," a 1958 comment on the tax exemption of charitable institutions asserted that the
exemption "differs only in method from a disbursement of government funds" and can
be justified only "when the public interest is served in much the same manner as when
public funds are properly expended." Reiling, supra note 1, at 595. For the concept of
tax expenditures, see OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES 1976, at 101-17 (1975); Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Sub-
sidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969); Surrey & Hellmuth, The Tax
Expenditure Budget-Response to Professor Bittker. 22 NAT'L TAX J. 528 (1969), Bittker,
The Tax Expenditure Budget-A Reply to Professors Surrey & Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAx
J. 538 (1969). The exemption of credit unions is listed as a tax expenditure in the 1976
Budget, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra at 108 (Table F-I), but other non-
profit organizations are not included. It is not clear whether they are omitted because
the amounts involved are too small to be significant or cannot be estimated with rea-
sonable accuracy, or because, as argued in this article, the exemptions can properly be
Vol. 85: 299, 1976
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The major shortcoming in the early legislative attitude toward non-
profit organizations, in our opinion, was a failure to give effect to the
distinction alluded to earlier in this article between "public service"
and "mutual benefit" organizations.'a To foreshadow our conclusions,
we will argue that nonprofit organizations engaged in "public service"
activities, broadly conceived, should be wholly exempted from income
taxation, because they do not realize "income" in the ordinary sense
of that term and because, even if they did, there is no satisfactory
way to fit the tax rate to the ability of the beneficiaries to pay. The
principal types of organizations, all of which currently enjoy some
form of tax exemption, that we would place in the public service




4. Social welfare organizations
5. Churches and other religious organizations
6. Political parties16
regarded as routine aspects of the income tax structure rather than as digressions from
an as yet undefined comprehensive tax base.
For a systematic examination of the tax treatment of entities, see Klein, Income
Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 13 (1972).
15. For these labels, and for other insights, we are indebted to an unpublished manu-
script by Professor George Cooper (on file with Yale Law Journal) proposing a revision
of existing law to accord different tax treatment to these two categories of organizations.
In using the distinction, we do not mean to deny that the benefactors of public
service organizations may derive "psychic" income from their benevolence, or conversely
that members of labor unions, chambers of commerce, and consumer cooperatives may
believe that their organizations confer benefits on the public while assisting their mem-
berships. Nor are we oblivious to the possibility that persons active in both categories
of organizations, when examined under the microscope of psychoanalysis or the telescope
of economic theory, may be found to be motivated by their own psychological or eco-
nomic objectives. (The same may be true of members of the House Appropriations Com-
mittee, George Meany, Ralph Nader, and other worthy citizens; but the Internal Revenue
Code taxes them only on their salaries, not on any bonuses in the form of psychic
income.) Since at either of these levels of analysis, the issues canvassed in the article
pale into insignificance, we are content with the more mundane assumption that there
is an operationally useful distinction between public service and mutual benefit or-
ganizations.
16. We discuss briefly the tax treatment of political parties, see pp. 303-04 supra;
pp. 328-30 infra, but the role of money in American politics has many tax ramifi-
cations which we have, reluctantly, chosen to pass over in silence. An adequate exami-
nation of these issues would plunge us into sociopolitical and constitutional problems
tangential to our main themes, including analysis of such overarching nontax issues
as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 591, 597, 599, 610 (Supp. IV 1974),
and its recent partial invalidation in Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976). The
longstanding refusal by the Treasury Regulations to allow taxpayers to deduct profit-
related lobbying expenses as business expenses under § 162 (summarized in Cam-
marano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 503 n.6 (1959), and superseded in 1962 by the
enactment of § 162(e)), the denial of tax exemptions to § 501(c)(3) organizations engaging
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By contrast with these public service organizations for which com-
plete exemption seems suitable, "mutual benefit" organizations are
best viewed, in our opinion, as conduits through which the members
pursue their own ends. The activities of such an organization should
be imputed to its members as though there were no intervening entity.
On this theory, the organization as such would not be taxed, but the
members would be taxed if and to the extent that the group activities,
when imputed to them, generated income for them. 17 Current law
confers some form of tax exemption on a bewildering array of mutual
benefit organizations.'8 We shall discuss the following, which appear
to be the most important within this broad category:
1. Social clubs
2. Consumer cooperatives and similar organizations
3. Labor unions
4. Trade associations
In this article we are concerned with the income tax exemption ac-
corded to both public service and mutual benefit organizations on
their own receipts, not with the right of benefactors to take income,
gift, or estate tax deductions for their gfits ana bequests to nonprofit
organizations. Because these quite separate .issues are often confused,
however, it is important to note that contributions can be deducted
by the donor if the recipient is a charitable, educational or religious
organization, and that there is also a recently enacted token deduction
in any of a wide range of political activities, and the ,denial by § 271 of bad debt de-
ductions for loans to political parties can all be regarded as efforts to free the political
process from the influence of wealth, or, from another perspective, as lopsided interven-
tions by government imposing disabilities on some groups and types of political activity
but not on others. See generally Boehm, Taxes and Politics, 22 TAX L. REV. 369 (1967);
Clark, The Limitation on Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law of Charities,
46 VA. L. REV. 439 (1960); Fogel, To the I.R.S., 'Tis Better to Give than to Lobby, 61
A.B.A.J. 960 (1975); Troyer, Charities, Law-Making, and the Constitution: The Validity
of the Restrictions on Influencing Legislation, N.Y.U. 31sT INst. ON FED. TAx 1415 (1973).
17. The imputation of income to the members of mutual benefit societies entails de-
ferring the tax until the benefits are actually received, while not taxing the societies
themselves. This treatment can be compared with that accorded "deferral organizations,"
such as teachers' retirement fund associations (§ 501(c)(11)) and funds for the payment of
supplemental unemployment benefits (§ 501(c)(17)). Both organizations are exempted from
tax by § 501(a). The beneficiary of retirement fund payments, however, is taxed upon
receipt of those payments to the extent that they exceed his contributions. § 72. The
recipient of unemployment benefits from a private fund is taxed in the same way. Rev.
Rul. 59-5, 1959-1 Cums. BULL. 12.
18. But some nonprofit mutual benefit societies are taxed. One example is the
American Automobile Association, discussed p. 350 infra, which is denied exempt status
as a social club because its activities do not involve the requisite "social contacts"
between members and does not qualify for any other exemption. See also Rev. Rul. 70-32,
1970-1 Cums. BULL. 132, denying exemption to a flying club, apparently because the
nature of the sport precluded "significant commingling of members."
Vol. 85: 299, 1976
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or credit for certain political contributions.' Payments to other types
of nonprofit organizations do not entitle the donor to a deduction,
unless the payment (union dues, for example) qualifies as a "business
expense" within the meaning of § 162 of the Internal Revenue Code.20
I. The Tax Status of "Public Service" Organizations
A. Measuring the "Income" of Public Service Organizations
Though differing in form and in the boundaries of their permis-
sible activity, all exempt organizations engaged in public service ac-
tivities share one common feature: if they were deprived of their
exempt status and treated as taxable entities, 21 computing their "net
income" would be a conceptually difficult, if not self-contradictory
task. From its inception, the federal income tax has been imposed
not on gross receipts or gross income, but on an adjusted net amount
-roughly speaking, gross income less business expenses. As a guide
in computing "net" or "taxable" income, an extensive body of legal
and accounting principles derived from business and financial prac-
tice has been developed. But these principles rest on the premise that
the organization seeks to maximize its profit, and hence are not a
satisfactory way of measuring the success of organizations that reject
this basic premise. 22 When the familiar methods of income measure-
19. Section 41 allows a maximum credit for political contributions in a taxable year
of 525 (550 for a joint return under § 6013). Alternatively, under § 218, the taxpayer
may deduct up to $100 (S200 on a joint return). Pub. L. No. 93-625, §§ 11(a), (d),
12(a), (b), 88 Stat. 2108 (1975).
20. Dues and assessments paid by members of labor unions are deductible under
§ 162 as business expenses, Rev. Rul. 72-463, 1972-2 Cu.s. BULL. 93, but not if the em-
ployee elects the standard deduction. See, §§ 62(2), 63(b); p. 354 infra. Similarly, pay-
ments to pension funds which are required as condition of union membership are
deductible. Rev. Rul. 54-190, 1954-1 Cuss. Bun.. 46. At the other end of the employment
spectrum, corporations and occasionally businessmen, may be able to deduct dues paid
to social and other clubs if they can demonstrate that these memberships are maintained
for "business purposes" only. See § 274; George Durgom, 33 CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. 276 (1974);
Anthony Quinn, 33 CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. 310 (1974). See also § 170(c)(3) and (4), allowing
charitable deductions for contributions to veterans' posts and, under certain conditions,
to fraternal orders.
21. For present purposes, it does not matter whether thL organization is treated as
a corporation or as a trust in computing the amount of the hypothetical tax; we are
concerned here only with the threshold problem of measuring its "income." Even if it
were treated as a partnership, the organization's tax status would raise similar issues,
since its "income" (or loss) would then have to be computed in order to allocate an
appropriate amount to each "partner" See Sanden, What to Do About the Loss of
Exemption; Effect Upon the Organization and Its Members, N.Y.U. 24TH INST. ON Fan.
TAx. 167 (1966).
22. The accounting profession has had to develop special procedures for analyzing the
financial affairs of exempt organizations since "[t]he concept of profit accountability
typically present in private business is not pertinent to most nonprofit entities." E.
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ment prescribed by the Internal Revenue Code, the accounting pro-
fession, or administrative practice are applied to nonprofit organiza-
tions, these methods must be stretched to, or beyond, the breaking
point.
This result can be readily illustrated by a simple example.23 Assume
that a charitable organization's receipts and disbursements for the
year are as follows:
Receipts: (thousands)
1. Interest from endowment $100
2. Membership dues 25
3. Gifts and bequests 75
4. Total receipts $200
Disbursements:
5. Salaries of staff $ 25
6. Medical welfare program for indigent persons 125
7. Total disbursements $150
Net:
8. Receipts less Disbursements (line 4 minus line 7) $ 50
The first step in computing this organization's hypothetical taxable
income is to take account of its endowment income (line 1), but noth-
ing else is this simple. Should the dues paid by its members (line 2)
be treated as gifts to the organization and excluded from gross income
under § 102, which provides that gifts and bequests are not taxable?
Or are dues the functional equivalent of business income because
the organization has obtained them by advertising its activities, promis-
ing to apply the funds to its announced charitable purposes, and al-
lowing the members to participate in its affairs in the manner speci-
fied by its charter and by-laws? Similarly, do the gifts and bequests
HENKE, ACCOUNTING FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 9 (1966). See also M. GRoss, FINANCIAL
AND ACCOUNTING GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 13-14 (1972):
In oversimplified terms, it might be said that the ultimate objective of a commercial
organization is to realize net profit for its stockholders through the performance of
some service wanted by other people, whereas the ultimate objective of a nonprofit
organization is to meet some socially desirable need of the community or its
members.
So long as the nonprofit organization has sufficient resources to carry out its
objectives, there is no real need or justification for "making a profit" or having a
surplus.
For an application of these principles to a specific area, see AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIA-
TION, CHART OF ACCOUNTS FOR HOSPITALS (1973).
23. The example and discussion are based on Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Con-
stitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285, 1298-99 (1969). The senior author apologizes to his faithful
readers, if any, for the partial overlap.
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(line 3) qualify for exclusion from the organization's gross income
under § 102, or should that provision be restricted to gifts and be-
quests received by individuals in a personal context, and not applied
to amounts received by an organization as a result of its systematic
solicitation of contributions? To the extent that dues, gifts, and be-
quests are used to increase the organization's endowment, should they
be treated as contributions to capital, excluded from gross income
under § 118?
At a more fundamental level, in view of the organization's duty to
use contributions for its charitable purposes, should it be regarded as
a mere conduit through which the funds move from the donor to
the ultimate recipients, without creating any tax consequences for the
intermediary?24 If an individual puts funds into a separate bank ac-
count to be used by him for charitable purposes, the deposit itself
(as distinguished from interest thereon) could hardly be regarded as
creating income. Should the dues and contributions received by a
charitable organization be seen as a series of such individual deposits,
which do not become taxable income simply because they are jointly
administered by, or for, the benefactors? Or should the organization
be treated as having a life of its own, separate from its contributors,
and thus as having "income" when it collects funds that will be
disbursed in a significantly different manner, given the natural evolu-
tion of bureaucracies, from the way the individuals would have spent
their own funds if acting independently?
Once these puzzles in the definition of the organization's gross
income have been solved, we must then decide which expenses may
be deducted to arrive at net income. Do staff salaries (line 5) con-
stitute "ordinary and necessary business expenses" under § 162, when
paid by an organization that does not seek profits? Individuals who
engage in such benevolent activities as giving money to needy rela-
tives, acquaintances, or beggars cannot deduct their contributions,
let alone any expenses for travel, advice, or bookkeeping incurred in
distributing their largesse, no matter how extensive and systematic
their generosity may be.- 5 Is this the proper analogy in deciding
24. See Edward F. Webber, 21 T.C. 742 (1954), afj'd sub nom. Webber v. Commissioner,
219 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1955) (contributions to a radio preacher that were earmarked by
donors for foreign missionaries held not income to taxpayer, who served as a conduit,
and had no right to retain the donations).
25. Under § 170(c), gifts qualify as deductible charitable contributions only if the
recipient is a corporation, trust, foundation, or similar organization. For denial of the
deduction when the recipient lacked the proper institutional status, see Dejong v. Com-
missioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962); Chester D. Tripp, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ff 63,244
(1963); Rev. Rul. 58-303, 1958-1 Coat. BULL. 61.
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whether a charity can deduct its expenses, or should it instead be treat-
ed as an enterprise whose "business" is benevolence? The answer to
these questions will bear on the proper classification of the medical
and welfare program (line 6). If the salaries paid to the organization's
staff are deductible business expenses because the charity's "business"
is charity, then the funds given by it to the indigent should also be
treated as business expenses.
The Internal Revenue Service has persistently asserted, with sub-
stantial success in the litigated cases, that expenditures not motivated
by the desire for profit cannot be deducted as business expenses under
§ 162. For example, the taxpayer is allowed to offset any receipts gen-
erated by his "hobbies" against his related expenditures, but cannot
deduct the loss if expenditures exceed receipts .2  If applied to non-
profit organizations, this interpretation of § 162 would lead to a
bizarre result, which can be illustrated by a simple example. Assume
two retirement homes for the poor, each of which is operated by a
nonprofit (but nonexempt) corporation and has 100 guests whose
maintenance costs $3,000 per year each. If the first home operates
at the breakeven point because it charges each guest $3,000 annually,
it will, like the hobby farmer operating a breakeven farm, have neither
income nor loss. If the second home has an endowment of $3 million,
producing $300,000 interest per year, and is hence able to open its
doors to guests who cannot afford to pay at all, it will have $300,000
26. § 183 enacted in 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 571; § 183(e) added by amend-
ment in 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 525. See Oshins, Proposed Regulations Provide
New Rules for the Hobby Loss Game, 35 J. TAx 214 (1971). For a further discussion
of this question, see Iowa State Univ. of Science & Technology v. United States, 500 F.2d
508, 521-22 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (cases cited therein). In Estate of Leslie E. Johnson, 56 T.C.
944, 948 (1971), the Tax Court assumed that a nonprofit institution has no "income"
under current law if it operates at an economic loss: "As a practical matter a uni-
versity's exemption from taxation is generally no more than an amnesty from filing re-
turns since generally the costs of operation exceed its income." This assumption is be-
lied by Iowa State. (By a curious coincidence, Johnson's Estate involved an employee of
the very same university.) Compare Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d
253 (9th Cir. 1963) (a nonexempt corporation organized to supply water to its share-
holders without profit used income from collateral activities to reduce water charges to
below its cost, and was permitted to deduct water expenses from its collateral income,
as well as from the water income), with Chicago & W.I.R.R. v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d
786 (7th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 310 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1962) (contra).
Section 277, enacted in 1969, allows nonexempt membership corporations to deduct
expenses of providing goods and services to members from income attributable to such
activities, but not from income attributable to unrelated activities or investments; until
its enactment, there was very little authority on the computation of income in the case
of genuinely nonprofit organizations (as distinguished from those conducted for personal
gain) which for some reason fail to qualify for tax exemption. For the uncertain status
of political parties before the enactment of § 527 in 1974, see S. REP. No. 93-1357, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. pt. J (1974).
310
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of gross income27 but no deductible expenditures, because its main-
tenance charges do not arise in a profit-seeking venture.2 8 It will,
therefore, be subject to a corporate tax of $138,500 (at current rates),
or more than 45 percent of its gross income, even though its guests
are wholly indigent, while the other institution, whose guests may have
been better off to begin with, will have no taxes to pay.
29
At first blush, the comparison may seem incomplete, since the per-
sonal tax status of the paying guests of the first institution has not
been taken into account. Is the tax on the free institution simply a
substitute for the income taxes paid by the paying guests of the first
institution on their personal income, so that their $3,000 annual fees
are after-tax amounts, while the expenditures of the free institution
are also after-tax amounts? The trouble with this effort to reconcile
the two cases is that the paying guests may be below the taxable in-
come level, or derive their $3,000 fees from exempt social security
benefits, gifts from members of their families, or other exempt sources.
And even if their income had been fully taxed, their effective rate
would not have been comparable to the 45 percent tax imposed on
the free institution (and hence indirectly on its guests) unless they
came from the upper reaches of the income ladder-$75,000 or above.
Moreover, this way of analyzing the two cases suggests that the endow-
ment income of the free institution should be imputed to the guests
it supports, and this in turn implies that if they are below, or even
substantially above, the poverty level, they are being grossly overtaxed.
In an effort to avoid this unpalatable dilemma, it might be argued
that the concept of "business expenses" should be enlarged, by statu-
tory amendment if necessary, to permit nonprofit institutions to de-
duct all amounts expended to advance their charitable or other non-
profit objectives. This would achieve substantially the same result as
27. Even though its clientele is limited to indigent guests, the organization might
fail to qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3) or § 501(c)(4) (as construed in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1959)) because of a nonqualified organizational status, see note 25
supra, because it engaged in political activities, or for other reasons. See note 130 infra.
28. See Del Ray Fraternity, Inc., P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. (Tax Ct. Mem.) f
75,206 (June 26, 1975) (nonexempt nonprofit organization may not deduct scholarships as
business expenses). The discussion in the text is concerned solely with expenses incurred
in maintaining nonpaying guests; the organization would be allowed to deduct the cost
of collecting its income, safeguarding its endowment, and similar activities related to its
income-producing property.
29. The illustration in the text is inspired by Eden Hall Farm v. United States, 389
F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1975), where the Internal Revenue Service sought to tax the
gross income-except for deductions not here relevant-of a nonprofit organization op-
erating a vacation home on a no-fee basis. Cf. People's Educ. Camp Soc'y, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 331 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 839 (1964) (vacation resort op-
erated by taxable, but nonprofit, organization; taxed on net profits, not its gross receipts).
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tax exemption, save for amounts earned in one year and either accumu-
lated for future expenditure or spent on buildings and equipment.
Since these accumulations and capital outlays are irrevocably dedicated
to the institution's nonprofit objectives, however, we do not regard this
alternative mode of computing a nonprofit organization's income as
very appealing; nor can we see that it has any economic or social ad-
vantages over a regime of complete exemption.
If, as we believe, any attempt to treat charitable activity as a "busi-
ness" is self-contradictory, can the income of a charitable organization
be computed by treating its disbursements as charitable contributions,
to be deducted under the rules applicable to other philanthropically
inclined taxpayers? Although this approach seems more promising at
the outset as a method of computing income than the § 162 route
just examined, it proves on further analysis hardly more satisfactory.
To begin with, if the charity must rely on the current statutory
provision (§ 170) for its right to deduct charitable contributions, it
would encounter the obstacle that § 170 permits contributions to be
deducted only if they are channeled by the taxpayer claiming the
deduction through a nonprofit organization.3" Natural persons and
business organizations cannot deduct charitable contributions made
directly to needy individuals; and since philanthropic organizations
are themselves tax-exempt, there has heretofore been no need to al-
low them to deduct such benefactions. If they had to rely on § 170,
and it could be twisted to allow a deduction for direct grants to needy
persons when paid by a charitable organization, another obstacle is
encountered: taxpayers are allowed to deduct charitable contributions
only up to specified percentages of their adjusted gross or taxable in-
come-five percent, in the case of corporations. 31 If charitable organi-
zations were subject to these percentage restrictions, they would no
doubt consistently report higher profit margins on their gross receipts
than the nation's most successful business corporations. A charity with
$100,000 of income, for example, could deduct only $5,000 of chari-
table contributions if the five percent limit of § 170(c) applied, leaving
95 percent of its income as taxable "profit" even if the entire amount
was spent to advance its eleemosynary objectives. Yet removal of the
percentage limit for charities would mean that charities using all of
their receipts for charitable purposes would be "unprofitable" as judged
30. See note 25 supra.
31. § 170(b)(2). For an attempted application of this percentage restriction to a non-
profit organization by the Internal Revenue Service, see Eden Hall Farm v. United
States, 389 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1975). The Service's computation became moot when
the court held that the organization was exempt under § 501(c)(4).
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by Internal Revenue Code standards, while, conversely, those making
the smallest current contributions would be the most "profitable,"
even though the retained funds were allocated for charitable expendi-
tures in the immediate future.
Perhaps this curiously inverted standard of success might be avoided
by still another modification of customary standards of income mea-
surement. Existing law permits taxpayers to deduct charitable con-
tributions only in the year of payment; promises do not ordinarily
generate deductions until the obligation is discharged by an actual pay-
ment.32 This insistence on "payment" reflects the fact that impulsive
taxpayers may promise more than they will deliver, and then consume
their income rather than use it to pay their charitable pledges. A
similar skepticism underlies the fact that taxpayers engaged in busi-
ness are rarely allowed to deduct reserves for future business expenses,
such as the estimated cost of complying with a three-year guarantee
of products sold in the current year. 3 However unavoidable the ex-
penditures may seem, circumstances may change and the anticipated
liabilities not materialize, in which event the reserves will inure to
the benefit of the shareholders or partners of the enterprise.
By contrast, however, a charitable institution's income is, at the
very moment of receipt, irrevocably dedicated to nonprofit purposes,
with no possibility of reversion to the donor, directors, or other con-
trolling persons. For this reason, it would be logical to allow a de-
duction at that moment in computing the organization's income.34
The charity might thus be regarded as an accrual taxpayer whose
entire income is immediately committed to expenses related to its al-
truistic functions. If this suggestion were to be adopted, of course,
the deduction would always offset the charity's retained income, leav-
ing nothing to be taxed. Tax immunity would then have been achieved,
but by a more roundabout route than the straightforward exemption
of current law.
So far, we have not complicated the problem of measuring a non-
profit organization's income by assuming any expenditures for non-
32. See § 170(a)(l), permitting contributions to be deducted only in the year when "pay-
ment" is made, subject to the limited exception of § 170(a)(2) (accrual basis corporations
may deduct contributions in the year when they are authorized by the board of directors,
if payment is made within the first 75 days of the following taxable year).
33. See B. BrrrKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GiFt TAXATION 839-40 (4th
ed. 1972).
34. Cf. § 642(c)(I) (trusts and estates allowed an unlimited charitable deduction for
amounts distributed or permanently set aside for charitable purposes). For the 1969 re-
vision of this provision, see Tax Section Recommendation No. 1975-3, 28 TAx LAw. 1037,
1038 (1975).
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deductible capital outlays, but the effect of such investments must be
examined. If the Church of the Gospel spends all of its receipts to
support missionaries who live in tents, does it have less "net income"
than the Church of the Adoration, which uses some of its receipts to
construct a basilica (with an estimated useful life of 50 years) and to
purchase a reliquary whose useful life cannot be predicted, at least
not by the secular engineering methods with which the Internal Rev-
enue Service is conversant? If both churches were ordinary business
enterprises, the former could deduct all of its expenses currently, and
hence would have no net income, while the latter would have to
report income currently, because it could neither deduct nor depre-
ciate the cost of the reliquary and could depreciate only a small frac-
tion of the cost of the basilica. No doubt a church with reliquaries
and buildings is "rich" in certain senses; Savanarola might denounce
its possessions as an affront to the Almighty and Sotheby's could sell
them on the auction block. But in the more modest framework of an
income tax system, much can be said for treating both churches alike,
even if equality is not compelled by the establishment clause of the
First Amendment.
Depending, then, on the answers to these riddles, and depending
also on such statutory clarification as might be forthcoming, the "net
income" or "loss" of our hypothetical charity is one of a dozen dif-
ferent amounts. By itself, this possibility, though exasperating, is not
unprecedented; "income" is a vaguer concept than the layman imag-
ines. But our excursion has taken us through several unusually murky
caverns, leaving-in our view-no escape from the conclusion that the
very concept of "taxable income" for charitable or other public service
organizations is an exotic subject more suited to academic speculation
than to practical administration.5
B. The Appropriate Tax Rate for Public Service Organizations
If despite these conceptual difficulties a satisfactory measure of the
income of a charitable organization can be found, or if the difficulties
are simply overridden by legislative fiat in favor of an arbitrary for-
mula, we then face the problem of prescribing a suitable tax rate. This
should not be plucked from the sky, nor should the rates prescribed
for other taxpayers be applied to public service organizations unless
35. When Congress has explicitly decided to tax the income of nonprofit organizations,
it has avoided the task of prescribing rules to compute their overall income and has
instead taxed only such restricted and specifically defined amounts as their unrelated
business income, or certain investment income. See pp. 316-27 infra.
Vol. 85: 299, 1976
HeinOnline -- 85 Yale. L.J. 314 1975-1976
Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations
their circumstances are comparable. Contemporary tax theorists would
want a rate schedule that was consonant with either the "benefit" or
the "ability to pay" theories of taxation.3 6 Though vague and mal-
leable, these efforts to match the burden with the taxpayer's circum-
stances are less arbitrary than any alternative standard.
Ideally, since the economic burden of the tax will fall on the or-
ganization's ultimate beneficiaries (unless the tax prompts the bene-
factors to increase their gifts), the organization's income should be
imputed to these recipients so it can be taxed at each one's personal
tax rate. The difficulty with this approach, of course, is that the identi-
ty of the beneficiaries will rarely be known when the income is re-
ceived by the organization; in this respect, they resemble the benefi-
ciaries of a "sprinkling" trust.37 Recognizing that the beneficiaries of
a charitable organization are usually too widely dispersed to allow an
accurate imputation of the association's income, Congress might tax
the entity itself, as a surrogate for its beneficiaries, at the estimated
average rate at which the income would be taxed to the individuals
if an imputation were feasible. As an alternative, Congress might con-
clude that justice would be better served by foregoing any tax on the
entity's income, lest the estimated rate be higher than an accurate
imputation would have produced. This decision would draw strength
from the fact that an average rate, even if low, is bound to overtax
the most needy beneficiaries of most philanthropic organizations.
The fact that recipients of gifts, whether they benefit from personal
generosity or institutional philanthropy, are allowed by § 102 of the
Internal Revenue Code to exclude these receipts from their gross in-
come provides independent support for a decision to exempt charitable
36. See, e.g., R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
192-204 (1973).
37. The Code contains elaborate provisions for taxing the income of trusts which do
not regularly distribute all current income to beneficiaries. See §§ 665-669. The statutory
scheme seeks to tax the income allocable to each beneficiary as if current income were
entirely distributed every year. Each year the beneficiary is taxed on the current income
distributed to him, while the trustee pays the tax on the undistributed income. The
beneficiary and trustee pay at independent rates consonant with their separate taxable
incomes.
In years when the trust distributes more than the current distributable income, the
excess, called "accumulation distribution," is allocated to the earliest preceding year in
which the trust did not distribute all of its current income. (The allocation for each
preceding year is limited to that year's undistributed income.) This excess, together with
the proportionate amount of taxes actually paid by the trust in that preceding year,
is deemed to have been distributed to the beneficiary as income in that year. The
beneficiary is then taxed at the rate at which he would have been taxed had the income
actually been distributed to him; if necessary, he receives a credit for the amount of
taxes already paid by the trust on that income. The beneficiary is thus, albeit be-
latedly, taxed according to his ability to pay.
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organizations. Since direct gifts from the original donor to the ulti-
mate recipients would be excluded from their gross income, it would
not be inappropriate to allow the same amount to pass untaxed through
the organization, viewing it as a conduit to convey gifts from donors
to their beneficiaries, rather than as an entity with independent tax-
paying ability.38 Moreover, the benefits of a vast range of government
services are received tax-free by citizens; this state of affairs has long
been accepted as unavoidable, because it is simply not feasible to
measure and impute the value of these benefits to the recipients in
order to tax each person at an appropriate marginal rate.39 The lar-
gesse of public service organizations is not much different, and this
analogy argues for exempting their income from taxation, thus allow-
ing their resources to pass intact to the beneficiaries.
C. The Legislative Retreat from Complete Tax Exemption
Whether for the reasons just canvassed, or because of a more general
attitude of benevolence toward charitable and other public service
organizations, Congress for many years granted them a complete ex-
emption from income taxation. This statutory immunity was partly
withdrawn by Congress in 1950, however, and there have since been
several other legislative retreats. We turn now to these statutory limi-
tations on the unqualified exemption that prevailed from 1913 to
1950.40
1. The Tax on "Unrelated Business Income"
In granting tax exemption to corporations "organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable ... or educational purposes," Con-
gress clearly did not intend -to disqualify nonprofit organizations that
receive dividends and interest on their endowments. They are not
organized and operated for the "purpose" of collecting income from
38. To be sure, Congress has chosen to distinguish between gifts to organized charities
and gifts to individuals by allowing donors to deduct the former, but not the latter,
as charitable contributions under § 170. But this distinction has its own rationale;
see note 25 supra. The "conduit" theory advanced above would not embrace the income
generated by the contributions while they were in the possession of the charity (i.e.,
interest and dividends on its endowment): § 102 exempts gifts, but not the income
earned thereafter on donated property.
39. See Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80
HA v. L. REv. 925, 935-38 (1967), reprinted in B. BiTrxt et al., A COMPREHENSIVE INCO tr
TAX BASE? A DEBATE 11-14 (1968).
40. In describing the 1913-1950 statutory exemption as "unqualified," we do not, of
course, mean to disregard the loss of immunity that could be incurred by violating
such statutory conditions as the prohibitions on legislative activities and on the inure-
ment of the organization's earnings to private benefit.
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their investments, any more than they are organized and operated for
the purpose of soliciting and collecting dues and contributions. Their
investment income, like their other receipts, is collected for the pur-
pose of supporting their exempt activities and hence is a means rather
than an end. The same can be said of the profit derived by charities
from the active conduct of a business, as was recognized in the major
early litigated cases rejecting the Internal Revenue Service's attempt
to tax their business profits.41 As one court pointed out, if for some
unforeseen reason a nonprofit organization could no longer serve the
exempt functions for which it was created, "it would have no cause to
continue in existence" even though its business activities were profit-
able.42 Like dividends, interest, membership dues, and contributions,
business profits are sought by such an organization not for their own
sake, but only as a way of financing the organization's ultimate (and
exempt) purposes.
The 1913-1950 status of so-called "feeder" corporations, which en-
gage in investment and business activities for the sole benefit of an
affiliated charitable organization, was more problematical. Since their
profits go exclusively to the parent, the courts might have accorded
them a kind of "piggyback" exemption, even though they do not carry
out exempt functions directly; it would not have distorted the statu-
tory language to hold that a feeder corporation was "organized and
operated exclusively" for exempt purposes, given the fact that its prof-
its were irrevocably dedicated to its parent's needs. At a time when
the Supreme Court's "destination of income" test enjoyed its full vi-
tality,43 this view would seem to have been compelling. Moreover, if
business or investment activities do not create tax liability when con-
ducted directly by a charitable organization, there is little reason to
treat them differently if the charity chooses to segregate them in a
separate organization, in order to protect its endowment against tort
liabilities or for other valid nontax reasons.
This spirit evidently animated the enactment in 1916 of what is
now § 501(c)(2), exempting:
41. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden De Predicadores De La Provincia Del Santismo
Rosario De Filipinas, 263 U.S. 578 (1924) (religious mission that earned income from
rents, interest, dividends, and sales of wine and chocolate was exempt from income
tax). The Court's "destination of income" test was applied even in cases where the
business activities were more substantial. See Unity School of Christianity, 4 B.T.A. 61,
68 (1926) (holding exempt a religious corporation's earnings from publications and an
inn); San Springs Home, 6 B.T.A. 198, 214 (1927) (income from such enterprises as a
greenhouse, a cotton gin, and an electric generating plant).
42. Unity School of Christianity, 4 B.T.A. 61, 69 (1926).
43. See note 41 supra.
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Corporations organized for the exclusive purpose of holding title
to property, collecting income therefrom, and turning over the
entire amount thereof, less expenses, to an organization which it-
self is exempt under this section.
Because this provision embraces only title-holding feeder corporations,
however, it inevitably created uncertainty about the tax status of sub-
sidiaries vested by their parent organizations with broader investment
and business functions. But in 1938, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held, in a decision that quickly became a leading case,
that the statutory exemption of title-holding feeder corporations was
not exhaustive, and that other feeder corporations could qualify for
exemption if their profits were dedicated to charitable purposes:
No reason is apparent to us why Congress should wish to deny
exemption to a corporation organized and operated exclusively
to feed a charitable purpose when it undoubtedly grants it if the
corporation itself administers the charity.44
The principle established by this decision lasted until 1950, when
Congress intervened to impose a tax on the so-called "unrelated busi-
ness income" of charitable organizations and certain other nonprofit
institutions. 45 This dramatic change was brought about by several
widely publicized acquisitions of nationwide businesses by exempt or-
ganizations through feeder corporations, which thereafter claimed tax
exemption for the previously taxable business profits. The most cele-
brated instance was the purchase of a large macaroni company by a
44. Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1938) (Judge L.
Hand dissented, arguing that the statutory exemption for titleholding corporations pre-
empted the field). This decision did not deprive the statutory predecessor of § 501(c)(2)
of a function; the Code (in § 501(c)) describes many exempt organizations by labels
(e.g., "civic leagues," "chambers of commerce," and "fraternal beneficiary societies")
that cannot be applied to their feeder corporations, with the result that the latter
could claim exemption only if embraced by § 501(c)(2). By contrast, § 501(c)(3) refers
to corporations "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable . . . or
educational purposes," a description that is broad enough to embrace their feeder or-
ganizations without reference to § 501(c)(2).
After Roche's Beach, charitable organizations and their feeder corporations were en-
titled to tax exemption, regardless of the source of their income, except in unusual
instances-primarily where business activities so far dwarfed the exempt functions that
the "exclusively for religious, charitable . . . or educational purposes" requirement was
violated. See, e.g., Lichter Foundation, Inc. v. Welch, 247 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1957); C.F.
Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951); Willingham v. Home Oil
Mill, 181 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1950). But see University Hill Foundation v. Commissioner,
446 F.2d 701, 702-04 (9th Cir. 1971). Nonprofit organizations not falling within § 501(c)(3)
could not avail themselves of the principle of Roche's Beach unless their "feeder" cor-
porations came within the narrow standards of § 501(c)(2). See University Hill Foundation
v. Commissioner, supra at 702-08.
45. See Latchman, Charitable Organizations and Federal Taxation, 3 W. Ras L. REV.
99 (1951); Comment, Colleges, Charities and the Revenue Act of 1950, 60 YALE L.J. 851
(1951).
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feeder corporation organized for the benefit of New York University's
law school. This acquisition, it was alleged, might lead to a monopoly
in pasta products because, being tax-exempt, the feeder corporation
could sell its merchandise for less, or use its tax-free profits to expand
more rapidly, than its taxable competitors.
These predictions of unfair competition were rarely subjected to
close analysis, and we know of no empirical examination of the re-
sults of such acquisitions.46 In particular, it was never made clear why
the price level that had maximized both the pretax and after-tax profits
of the enterprise before the change of ownership would not continue
to maximize its profits thereafter. 47 Equally mysterious was the un-
articulated but widely accepted assumption that charities would com-
pete unfairly with their taxable rivals in "active" manufacturing and
mercantile pursuits, but not in "passive" investment areas. No one
suggested, for example, that charities would lend their endowment
funds or rent their real estate for less than the going rate, and thus
drive private investors in these areas out of business; it was assumed,
rather, that "passive" investments by charities were no threat to taxable
enterprise.48 Nor was there any discussion of the possibility that, if
charities increased their ownership of active business enterprises, they
would correspondingly reduce their ownership of marketable securities
and other passive investments and, hence, compete less vigorously with
taxable investors for these assets.
Moreover, the labels "active" and "passive" were accepted as though
they denoted self-defining and clear-cut compartments, although in
fact the spectrum of profit-oriented activity is not readily bisected.
The owner of multi-unit residential real estate, for example, has many
46. For anecdotal material, see Mansfield, Some Aspects of Taxation of Business Income
of Exempt Organizations, in 3 TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM 2067 (House Comm. on Ways
& Means 1959); Sugarman, Business Income of Exempt Organizations, in id. at 2115.
See generally Ely, Federal Taxation of Income of States & Political Subdivisions, in id.
at 2091; Dunham, Business Activities of Exempt Scientific Research Organizations, in id.
at 2127; Gilpin, Business Income of Exempt Organizations-Tax Equalization-Electric
Utility Service Organizations, in id. at 2077; Harris, Tax Exempt Organizations, in id.
at 2101.
47. At least in the short run, no reason for a change in pricing policies is apparent;
and the long run results of shifting a business from taxable to tax-exempt status are
hard to predict except on an unrealistic assumption of perfect competition in a state
of equilibrium. See Comment, Colleges, Charities, and the Revenue Act of 1950, 60
YALE L.J. 851, 876 (1951); Klein, supra note 14, at 61-66.
48. But see Break & Pechman, Relationship Between the Corporation and Individual
Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAx J. 341, 344 (1975), proposing that the tax on the unrelated
business income of charitable organizations be extended to their investment income;
though recognizing that this would reduce their ability to finance their activities, the
authors say nothing about the relation of the proposed tax to the charitable benefi-
ciaries' ability to pay, evidently because they view the tax as a method of subjecting
the charitable institution itself to a "market test of the Value of its activities."
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options, including (1) leasing the entire project to an operator for an
amount unrelated to the latter's profits, (2) leasing it to an operator
for a percentage of the gross or net profits, (3) leasing the units to
separate tenants on long term leases, or (4) renting the units as hotel
accommodations to transients. The first of these arrangements is a
"passive" investment; the fourth is an "active" business; the other two
are less easily characterized. But all entail competition with private
owners of similar property, and it is hard to see why the charity would
be a more ruthless competitor, cut rents more severely, or expand
more rapidly with its tax-free profits in one situation than in the
others. When the 1950 legislation was proposed, there was some fear
that the acquisition of taxable business enterprises by tax-free feeder
corporations would narrow the federal tax base, but this danger seems,
in retrospect, overstated if not wholly erroneous. This is because the
sellers of the business would presumably reinvest the proceeds of the
sale in new enterprises, marketable securities, rental real estate, etc.,
which would produce a taxable yield to restore the status quo ante.
The charitable organization purchasing the enterprise, for its part,
would shift its investment from assets producing tax-free dividends,
interest, and rent to equally tax-free business profits. 49
Still another aspect of the alleged competitive threat posed by chari-
ties was virtually disregarded in the 1950 debate: whether the trustees
of nonprofit organizations would prove to be as energetic in the man-
agement of their enterprises, or as shrewd in selecting managers to
act for them, as private entrepreneurs. An objective observer might
have predicted that the business practices of charity-owned enterprises
would be characterized more by caution than boldness. 0°
Whether the fear of "unfair competition" was rooted in reality or
in fantasy, it carried the day. In 1950, Congress imposed the regular
corporate tax on the "unrelated business income" of most charitable
organizations and a number of other nonprofit groups, whether the
income accrues directly to the exempt parent or to a subsidiary feeder
corporation. 51 As expanded in 1969,52 these provisions reach:
49. If the charitable organization borrowed funds to effect the acquisition, the lender
would receive, and be taxed on, the same amount of interest that it would have received
from advancing the same funds to a taxable borrower.
50. We know of no effort to examine post-acquisition history of businesses pur-
chased by charitable organizations.
51. "The problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed is pri-
marily that of unfair competition." S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1950),
reprinted in 1950-2 Cuif. BULL. 483, 504. For the history of the 1950 legislation, see
Veteran's Foundation v. United States, 281 F.2d 912, 913-14 (10th Cir. 1960), and United
States v. Community Servs., 189 F.2d 421, 425-27 (4th Cir. 1951).
52. There were several statutory changes in the provisions on unrelated business in-
come between 1950 and 1969. See Pub. L. No. 85-367, 72 Stat. 80 (1958); Pub. L. No.
320
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[T]he gross income derived by any [exempt] organization from
any unrelated trade or business [as defined] regularly carried on
by it, less the deductions allowed by [Chapter 1, Subtitle A, of
the Internal Revenue Code] which are directly connected with
the carrying on of such trade or business .... 53
An "unrelated trade or business" is
any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially
related (aside from the need of such organization for income or
funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to the exercise
or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational,
or other purpose or function constituting the basis of its [tax]
exemption .... 54
There are-as always in the Internal Revenue Code-numerous
qualifications, conditions, and exceptions to the general rules just de-
scribed. 56 And it should be noted that the organization's exempt status
is not lost or directly affected by the receipt of unrelated business
income; the statutory remedy is limited to taxing that income.
The 1950 legislation did not withdraw the traditional exemption
of "passive" income:
Dividends, interest, royalties, most rents, capital gains and losses,
and similar items are excluded from the base of the tax on un-
related income because your committee believes that they are
"passive" in character and are not likely to result in serious com-
petition for taxable businesses having similar income. Moreover,
86-667, 74 Stat. 534 (1960); Pub. L. No. 88-380, 78 Stat. 333 (1964); Pub. L. No. 89-352,
80 Stat. 4 (1966); Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1588 (1966).
53. § 512(a)(1).
54. § 513(a). See Iowa State Univ. of Science & Technology v. United States, 500
F.2d 508 (Ct. CI. 1974) (university's TV station constitutes an unrelated trade or business).
See also § 513(c), enacted in 1969 to provide statutory support for a previously issued
Treasury regulation requiring income from advertising to be treated as unrelated business
income even though it appears in a periodical whose editorial content advances the
organization's exempt function; S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1969); Lehrfeld,
The Unfairness Doctrine: Commercial Advertising Profits as Unrelated Business Income,
23 TAx LAw. 349, 365 (1970). In 1976, the pre-1969 regulations were invalidated by
American College of Physicians v. United States, 37 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 76-806 (Ct. CL.
1976).
55. Among the more important items not taxed as "unrelated business income" are
income from dividends, interest, annuities, royalties, capital gains and losses, rents from
real property (but not when received from an 80 percent controlled company or from in-
vestments which are debt-financed), and a $1000 specific deduction. § 512(b). In addition,
an "unrelated trade or business" does not include activities in which substantially all
the work is performed by unpaid volunteers. § 513(a). See Note, The Macaroni Monopoly:
The Developing Concept of Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations, 81
HARv. L. REv. 1280 (1968). For problems in separating "related" from "unrelated"
business income, see Kannry, How Hospitals Can Minimize Their Potential Exposure to
the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 43 J. TAx. 166 (1975).
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[income-producing investments] of these types have long been
recognized as a proper source of revenue for educational and
charitable organizations and trusts.o
But income from certain leases of debt-financed property was denied
the status of exempt "passive" income and taxed as unrelated business
income by the 1950 legislation,57 which was expanded in 1969 to em-
brace a broader range of debt-financed acquisitions,s primarily on the
theory that the exempt organization may be "trading on its exemption"
by borrowing to acquire such property and using tax-free income to
pay off the debt. According to the 1950 committee reports, these "boot-
strap" transactions, if not checked, created a danger that "exempt or-
ganizations in the not too distant future may own the great bulk of
the commercial and industrial real estate in the country."
' 9
On analysis, however, these assertions are less persuasive than the
rhetoric in which they were wrapped. To begin with, unlike an Orien-
tal levitator, a charity cannot lift itself by its tax-exempt bootstraps
if it borrows funds at eight percent to acquire assets that will yield
56. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 CuM. BuLL.
483, 506.
57. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 944, § 422, 64 Stat. 948-50.
58. The expansion of § 514 was prompted by the decision in Commissioner v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965), in which petitioner sold all the stock in a closely held
company to a charity for $5,000 down (paid with company assets) and a SI,300,000 non-
interest bearing note which was to be paid off with future company income that could
be earned tax-free by the charity. The Supreme Court upheld capital gains treatment
for petitioners' gain, despite the Commissioner's argument that petitioner was using the
charity's tax exempt status to convert the company's future business income, normally
taxable at ordinary income rates, into capital gains. Section 514 was expanded, in the
wake of Brown, on the recommendation of the Treasury and the Staff of the Joint Com-
mittee on Internal Revenue. See Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Comm. on
H.R. 15942 and H.R. 15943, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); Cooper, Trends in the Taxation
of Unrelated Business Activity, N.Y.U. 29TH INsT. ON FED. TAx. 1999 (1971).
59. See note 56 supra. This is not the place for a disquisition on the law of property,
or for a full examination of the Pickwickian sense in which charities "owned" the
property involved in the kind of nonrecourse debt-financed transaction which was the
subject of the Brown case. Suffice it to say that the proper image is not that of a
proud freeholder, surveying his bountiful acres and lording it over his cowering tenants.
Throughout the entire term of the contract, the charity was an "owner" in name only
of a debt-ridden business, bound hand and foot to the mortgage on the one hand and
the business operator on the other; its "ownership" consisted of the right to a small
spread (if it was earned at all) between the business's receipts and its payments, plus a
reversion so far in the future that its discounted value was ordinarily close to zero.
These observations suggest, in turn, the validity of Lanning's conclusion that:
The central bootstrap issue is the tax characterization of the transfer of the
business . . . . [B]ootstrap owners appear to be receiving a steady flow of business
profits, as entrepreneurs rather than as creditors.
Lanning, Tax Erosion and the "Bootstrap Sale" of a Business-I, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 623,
692-93 (1960). This implies in its own turn that the appropriate remedy would have been
denial of capital gain treatment to the "sellers" by legislation, after the Supreme Court
refused to take this action in the Brown case.
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only eight percent. The cash flow will wash out, leaving no residue
with which to pay off the acquisition debt. Thus, the transaction does
not resemble the maneuver that is forbidden by § 265(2) (the deduc-
tion of interest paid on debt used to acquire tax-exempt state and
municipal bonds), which, in the absence of statutory constraints, would
enable the taxpayer to make money by a "wash" transaction, or even
by one that produced an economic loss if the tax saving exceeded the
difference between the interest paid by him and the interest received.
To profit from an investment financed with borrowed funds, an
exempt organization must be able to borrow at a lower rate than it
will receive from the new investment. But if we assume that the
charity borrows solely on the security of the investment and provides
no new management services-the only possible transaction in which
the charity contributes "nothing but its tax exemption" (clearly the
extreme form of the transactions reached by the 1950-1969 amend-
ments)-it is not easy to grasp why it would be able to borrow at a
more favorable rate than the yield on the assets to be acquired. More
concretely, why should a lender advance funds on an eight percent
nonrecourse basis to enable the charity to buy assets paying nine per-
cent, when the lender could get the nine percent yield, with the same
security, by lending to the original owner or by buying the assets
itself. O0
Of course, if the charity had other assets and pledged its general
credit, the transaction would reduce the lender's risk by increasing the
pool of assets subject to the debt; and hence an eight percent loan to
enable the charity to purchase assets yielding nine percent would be
commercially comprehensible. But the evil to be cured by § 514 was
a bootstrap transaction, not one in which the charity serves the econom-
ic function of assuming a genuine risk.
The model "evil" would be a situation in which funds to acquire
a nine percent investment could be borrowed at eight percent by either
the charity or its taxable competitor (the lender being ignorant of
the opportunity to get nine percent by investing directly), in which the
charity's taxable competitor loses out because its income tax on the one
percent spread would make it impossible for it to pay off the debt
as fast as the charity. If this is the paradigm case for which the
remedy of § 514 was prescribed, however, the charity's unfair advan-
60. If the charity's trustees know something about the target company that others
do not, their willingness to put this information at the charity's disposal means that
the charity is not trading on its tax exemption, but is benefiting from the charitable
impulses of its trustees. This is hardly an "abuse" calling for legislative action (unless
the information was acquired improperly), nor is it the announced target of § 514.
323
HeinOnline -- 85 Yale. L.J. 323 1975-1976
The Yale Law Journal
tage turns out to be rather slight. By devoting the entire one percent
spread to retirement of the purchase money mortgage, the charity
could amortize the debt in 28 years; its taxable competitor, whose
identical one percent gross spread would be reduced by taxes (assum-
ing a 50 percent rate) to 0.5 percent,61 would need 36 years to pay off
the same debt. Assuming a two percent spread-which of course in-
creases the likelihood that the lender would by-pass both the charity
and its competitor and invest on its own behalf in the assets yielding
the higher return-the amortization periods would be 20 1/2 years for
the charity and 28 years for its taxable rival.
Finally, the larger the spread between the yield from the business
assets and the interest that must be paid for the nonrecourse borrowed
funds, the more likely it is that a number of charities will compete
for the "deal." As the Government pointed out in its brief in Com-
missioner v. Brown (an unsuccessful assault on the seller's claim to
capital gain treatment on a debt-financed sale of business assets to
a charity):
[T]here are an almost unlimited number of possible tax-exempt
buyers and it requires, indeed, only a certificate of incorporation
for [the seller] to create one of his own. 62
Given this plenitude of potential exempt competitors, a charity cannot
demand too large a share of the hypothesized spread without inducing
the seller to seek out a more accommodating charity. This, in turn,
means (1) that the lion's share of the spread will probably gravitate
to the seller (whose reinvestment of this amount will generate taxable
profits to replace the now exempt profits of the transferred business,
as pointed out earlier), and (2) that the charity will not be able to cut
the prices charged for the products of the business without jeopardiz-
ing the flow of profits needed to keep abreast of its obligations to
the seller on the one hand and to the lender, on the other. To some
extent, of course, this model of an auction in which an infinite number
of charities bid against each other for an attractive target business
must be qualified by noting that the owners of other businesses may
be simultaneously seeking out the same charities and offering to sell
their enterprises for less. We do not claim to know exactly how this
clash of financial interests will be resolved in the market place; but
the mere fact that, so far as our research has disclosed, there has been
61. By using accelerated depreciation and similar tax privileges, the taxable owner
may in fact have more than a 0.5 percent after-tax spread available to pay off the loan.
62. Brief for Petitioner at 35, Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965). See note
58 supra.
324
Vol. 85: 299, 1976
HeinOnline -- 85 Yale. L.J. 324 1975-1976
Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations
no detailed examination of the subject by tax economists is melan-
choly evidence of the gap between scholarship in the tax field and
legislative action.63
But even if the fear of unfair competition between taxable and
tax-free enterprises was exaggerated, as we believe, it might be thought
that taxing the unrelated business income of exempt organizations
was justified on a narrower ground, viz., avoidance of an unwarranted
double exemption-one for the feeder corporation when the business
profits are earned, and a second for the exempt organization for the
dividends it receives from the feeder.
On analysis, however, this fear turns out to be a chimera. To begin
with, the profits of an unrelated business are taxed under the 1950
and 1969 rules even when it is conducted by the exempt organization
in its own right and where there was never more than one exemption
at stake. By withdrawing that exemption, Congress demonstrated that
it was concerned not with "double exemptions" arising as a matter
of form from an exempt organization's use of a subsidiary, but with
the status of the business profits themselves. This is made doubly
clear by the fact that if the feeder corporation engages solely in invest-
ment activities or in a business related to the exempt organization's
functions, both the feeder and the organization itself are entitled to
exemptions even under the 1950-1969 amendments. The second ex-
emption (for dividends received by the exempt organization from its
subsidiary) is less a reflection of congressional benevolence than a
device to avoid unwarranted taxation when income passes through a
purely formal corporate veil to the real party in interest. It is com-
parable to the right of an ordinary business corporation to deduct
either 85 percent or 100 percent of dividends received from other
domestic corporations, or to disregard intercorporate dividends en-
tirely by filing a consolidated return.
There remains a final point regarding the taxation of unrelated
business income. By reducing the amount that the exempt organiza-
tion can apply to its charitable or other purposes, the tax necessarily
burdens the beneficiaries of these activities, and their ability to pay
ought to be considered in deciding whether and to what extent to
impose the tax. Yet it was evidently never suggested during the 1950
63. Since the 1950 legislation did not curtail the right of nonprofit organizations to
purchase real estate with their own funds and use the tax-free rents thus generated to
expand their holdings, it would be interesting to know whether rich exempt organiza-
tions, in the ensuing quarter-century, have significantly increased their percentage owner-
ship of the nation's real estate. If they did, given the recent collapse of real estate
values, they must regret the failure of Congress to. impose the same constraints on self-
financed as on debt-financed acquisitions of rental real estatel
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and 1969 debates that the tax on the unrelated business income of
charitable organizations reflected the ability to pay of those affected
by it. Almost certainly, we believe, it did not, and thus made the
income tax more regressive. 64
2. The Investment Income and Capital Gains
of Private Foundations
Still another step in the retreat from the 1913-1950 policy of com-
plete exemption for charitable and other public welfare organizations
was taken in 1969, when Congress imposed an "excise tax" of four per-
cent on the "net investment income" of private foundations.a The
rationale for this tax is unclear. The House Committee on Ways and
Means proposed a 7.5 percent tax on investment income, in order to
require foundations to share the cost of the government services they
receive and to offset the cost of IRS audits. 6 The Senate balked at
a tax which implies "a beginning in the removal of income tax ex-
emption," and instead proposed a "user charge" to defray the cost of
audits, to be based on a percentage of noncharitable assets. 7 The
conference committee compromised on a four percent tax, without
explicitly choosing either a "sharing the cost of government" or an
"audit fee" rationale.68
Viewed as a method of financing the costs of government by taxing
"all of those able to pay," as proposed by the House, the tax is open
to two objections: (1) there is no reason to believe that the rate is
64. See note 48 supra.
65. § 4940. For the meaning of the term "private foundation," see pp. 326-27 infra.
"Net investment income" consists of (1) gross investment income (primarily "passive"
income which is not already taxed as unrelated business income under § 511), plus
(2) capital gains (determined by reference to a December 31, 1969 basis), less (3) capital
losses (but only to the extent of gains realized), (4) ordinary and necessary expenses in-
curred in the management of these income-producing assets, and (5) certain depreciation
and depletion allowances. § 4940. No deduction is allowed for expenses of the foundation's
eleemosynary activities. Treas. Reg. § 53A940-1(e) (1972).
66. H. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 Cut. But..
200, 213.
67. S. REP'. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 Cuss. Bun.
423, 442.
68. Simple arithmetic suggests that the Senate's views prevailed. The Senate proposed
a tax of one-fifth of one percent of noncharitable assets. Id. If the familiar assumption
is made that charities earn a five percent return on investments, a four percent tax
on investment income (disregarding capital gains and allowable deductions) is equivalent
to the Senate's proposed rate of tax.
In practice, the revenue derived from the § 4940 tax has not been specifically allocated
to audit functions by the Internal Revenue Service; and the revenue generated appar-
ently far exceeds the estimated cost of foundation audits. Commission on Private Philan-
thropy and Public Needs, Philanthropy and the Federal Tax System, 1973, at 29 (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with Yale Law journal).
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appropriately related to the economic status of the beneficiaries of
foundation assistance (who, directly or indirectly, will presumably
bear the burden of the tax); and (2) there is no reason to believe that
these persons have a greater ability to pay taxes than those who benefit
from the activities of charitable organizations that are exempt from
the tax, such as churches, schools, hospitals, and publicly supported
foundations. Indeed, the ultimate beneficiaries of both types of or-
ganizations are ordinarily the same, since private foundations make
most of their grants to charitable organizations themselves exempt
from the new tax. To this extent, the tax imposes an economic burden
on the ultimate beneficiaries if income reaches them by one route
rather than another.
If the tax is viewed not as a method of imposing the general costs
of government on persons according to their ability to pay but as
an "audit fee," its status is somewhat more complicated. All nonprofit
organizations are subject to statutory restrictions whose enforcement
entails some supervising and auditing by the Government. No reason
was given by the congressional committees for requiring private foun-
dations, but not other organizations, to reimburse the Government for
these enforcement expenses. It is dubious to assume, without evidence,
that private foundations are inherently given to greater abuses and
therefore require more expensive audit, than other nonprofit groups.69
Nor is there any justification for requiring charitable foundations to
pay audit costs while nonprofit groups operated for the mutual benefit
of their members (such as social clubs, labor unions, and business
leagues) are audited at public expense.
The "excise tax" on private foundations illustrates the ambiguities
inherent in any effort to reach deeper into the pockets of the non-
profit world. Like a tax on the manufacture of cigarettes or the sale
of firearms, it is levied on events that have no relationship to the
economic status of the person who must bear its burden. Because
it was launched as an "audit fee," the 1969 assault on the tax ex-
emption of private foundations was perhaps more palatable to Con-
gress than an explicit excise tax on the receipt of philanthropic grants
would have been. But the economic result of the tax was no different.
The tax as enacted is almost surely regressive, and undeniably creates
inequalities among otherwise similar exempt organizations. The tax
base-net investment income-is computed by deducting a limited num-
ber of expenses and losses from a limited category of gross income;
the resulting amount bears little resemblance to the "net income" that
69. See pp. 341-42 infra.
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is the normal target of federal income taxation. These deficiencies in
the 1969 legislation are consistent with and, in a sense, confirm our
theory that nonprofit organizations simply do not realize "income"
in the normal sense. Congress was thus forced to define the tax base
for private foundations in a mechanical-and largely arbitrary-way.
The remedy of Procrustes for the guest who does not fit his al-
lotted bed is no more attractive today than in ancient Greece.
3. The 1975 Tax on "Political Organization Taxable Income"
In the wake of Watergate, Congress was impelled in 1975 to clarify
the uncertain tax status of the national political parties, which had
never been granted a statutory tax exemption but had never filed tax
returns. To use the more delicate language of the Senate Finance
Committee:
Historically, the Internal Revenue Service has not generally re-
quired the filing of income tax returns by political organizations7 °
Congress also wished to resolve a number of other tax issues growing
out of political activity, including the applicability of the federal gift
tax to political contributions, the treatment of unexpended political
funds, and the donation of property which had appreciated since its
acquisition by the donor. The result was a network of interrelated
statutory provisions.71
70. S. REP. No. 93-1357, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1974). See pp. 303-04 supra. One ex-
ception, a blatantly discriminatory episode in the Internal Revenue Service's history, is
described as follows by the Committee:
However, it appears that the Government took a contrary public position on at
least one occasion, in attempting to sustain an asserted income tax deficiency against
the Communist Party. In that case (Communist Party of the U.S.A. v. Commissioner,
373 F.2d 682 (CAD.C., 1967)), the Court of Appeals stated that "the Government
now assures us that all political parties, including petitioner are taxable associations
under the statute. That may be, but the Tax Court did not so rule; and petitioner
is entitled to an adjudication in that court of its contention that the statute is not
to be construed because the Commissioner and his predecessors have never so con-
strued it." [Footnote omitted.] The case was remanded to the Tax Court, but the
Government conceded virtually all of the asserted tax, and so the Tax Court never
ruled on this question. The committee is not aware of any other instances in which
the Internal Revenue Service has attempted to require a political party, as such,
to file a Federal income tax return or to pay a Federal income tax.
S. REP. No. 93-1357, supra at 26 n.l.
The Government's "assurance" referred to by the court is puzzling; one can hardly
assume that the Service was unaware of the nonfiling practice of political parties.
71. See note 16 supra; Boehm, Taxes and Politics, 22 TAx L. REv. 369 (1967); Bruce,
Taxing of Political Organizations, Candidates, Contributors, 62 A.B.A.J. 123 (1976); Kaplan,
Taxation and Political Campaigns: Interface Resolved, 53 TAxFs 340 (1975); Streng, The
Federal Tax Treatment of Political Contributions and Political Organizations, 29 TAx
LAw. 139 (1975).
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The 1975 provisions relating to the tax status of political organiza-
tions themselves were summarized by the Senate Finance Committee
as follows:
In general, the committee's bill provides that political organiza-
tions are to be treated as tax-exempt organizations, since political
activity (including the financing of political activity) as such is
not a trade or business which is appropriately subject to tax. How-
ever, where assets are not currently used by a political organization
for political activities, but are invested for use at a later date, the
income from the investment (less direct expenses incurred in
earning that income) is to be subject to tax.7 2
Although the details need not detain us, the tax base for political
groups is not investment income by itself, but a statutory construct
bearing the label "political organization taxable income." 73 The com-
putation of this amount starts with the organization's gross income
(excluding "exempt function income"-primarily contributions, dues,
and the proceeds of fund raising events), from which the direct ex-
penses of producing the gross income are deducted. As is true of the
excise tax on private foundations, no allowance is granted for the
expenses of discharging the taxpayer's exempt-and hence primary-
functions, nor can the political group deduct any of its general ad-
ministrative expenses or take the dividends received deduction al-
lowed to other corporations. 4
The defects of the 1969 excise tax on private foundations are re-
peated in the 1975 tax on political organizations:7 5 the tax base is
simply an aggregation of items that does not measure the improve-
ment during the taxable year in anyone's economic status and the rate
is equally unrelated to anyone's ability to pay. But the legislation
should not really be judged by normal "tax" standards. It is, rather,
a manifestation of discontent with the role of money in the political
process; and whether the punishment fits the crime can only be decided
in an inquiry with a totally different scope from the one that we
have set for ourselves.
We very much fear, however, that the 1969 and 1975 inroads on the
tax exemption of nonprofit institutions just detailed will soon give
72. See note 70 supra; S. REP. No. 93-1357, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 25, 26 (1974).
73. § 527.
74. Regardless of their formal structure, all political organizations are subject to the
corporate tax rate. § 527(b)(1).
75. Note the prescient observation of Labovitz: "[T]he 4 percent tax on investment
income of private foundations is a bad [idea] that threatens to be carried further."
Labovitz, 1969 Tax Reforms Reconsidered, in THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS 101, 108
(F. Heimann ed. 1973).
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rise to allegations that those who have escaped these limitations have
benefited from "loopholes" that must be closed in order to re-establish
the "integrity" of the federal income tax system. The rhetoric to sup-
port such a proposal, however specious, is at hand;TO it would be child's
play to write the speeches. Only a strong sense of history will serve
to remind us that withdrawal from an unjustified venture-domestic
or foreign-is sometimes better than proceeding through the tunnel
and bombing everything in sight.
II. The Tax Status of Public Service Organizations-
Some Specific Problems
Now that we have analyzed the taxation of public service organiza-
tions in general terms, it remains for us to review their tax status in
detail and to apply the broad principles we have derived to specific
classes of organizations.
A. Charitable Organizations
Charitable organizations have been exempt from federal income
taxes since 1894, 77 but Congress has never seen fit to provide a statu-
tory definition of the term "charitable." The Treasury has not at-
tempted to fill this vacuum, preferring instead to refer in the Regula-
tions to the term's "generally accepted legal sense," and to "the broad
outlines of 'charity' as developed by judicial decisions."78 By way of
illustration, the current Regulations go on to say:
[Charity] includes: Relief of the poor and distressed or of the
underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of edu-
cation or science; erection or maintenance of public buildings,
monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of Government;
and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to ac-
complish any of the above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood
tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to
defend human and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to combat
community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.7t '
The Regulations, as well as most of the judicial decisions whose defi-
nitions they incorporate by reference,so echo the British Statute of
76. See generally Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes" and Political Rhetoric, 71 MIcii.
L. Riv. 1099 (1973).
77. See note 2 supra.
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959).
79. Id.
80. A much quoted summary of the scope of a "charity" appears in an 1891 British
case: •
"Charity" in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief
330
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Charitable Uses (1601).81 The language in the Regulations has been
modernized, but the spirit is unchanged.
As interpreted in applying § 501(c), "charitable" overlaps-indeed
is virtually interchangeable with-the terms "eleemosynary," "philan-
thropic," and "benevolent." Despite the vagueness of the term and
the divergent activities which it embraces, 2 the unadorned reference
to "charitable purposes" in § 501(c)(3) has created only minor prob-
lems of interpretation for tax planners, administrators, and the
courts . 3 In any event, it is not likely that a detailed statutory defi-
of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of
religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling
under any of the preceding heads.
Commissioners for Special Purpose of Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531, 583.
81. The Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (1601), outlined the scope of
charitable purposes in its preamble, which included expenditures for:
Releife of aged impotent and poore people, some for Maintenance of sicke and
maymed Souldiers and Marriners, Schooles of Learninge, Free Schooles and Schollers
in Unif'sities, some for Repaire of Bridges Portes Havens Causwaies Churches Sea-
bankes and Highewaies, some for Educadon and Pferments of Orphans, some for
or towardes Releife Stocke or Maintenance for Howses of Correccon, some for
Mariages of poore Maides, some for Supportac6n Ayde and Helpe of younge Trades-
men, Handiecmftesmen and .psons decayed, and others for releife or redemption of
Prisoners or Captives, and for aide or ease of any poore Inhabitantt con~ninge
paymente of Fifteenes, settinge out of Souldiers and other Taxes ....
For a suggestion that this language was copied from William Langland's The Vision
of Piers the Plowman, see Moe, "The Vision of Piers the Plowman" and the Law of
Foundations, 102 PROCEEDINGS OF THE A.. PHIL. Soc'Y 371 (1958).
The modern definition of "charity" in the Regulations, while no longer explicitly
embracing "releife or redemption of Prisoners or Captives .... " was construed to
allow deduction of gifts to ransom the Bay of Pigs prisoners.
82. See Ould v. Washington Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303, 311 (1877):
A charitable use, where neither law nor public policy forbids, may be applied to
almost any thing that tehds to promote the well-doing and well-being of social man.
Sce al,%o Kain v. Gibboney, 101 U.S. 362, 365 (1879) (charity is "a gift for a public use");
IV A. Scott, THE L.Aw OF TRUSTs § 368, at 2855 (3d ed. 1967).
83. The most notable recent issue is whether a segregated institution can qualify as
"charitable." To the effect that a racially discriminatory private school cannot qualify,
.ee Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1156 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam sub nora.
Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). During this litigation, the Treasury issued a revenue
ruling which relied on both federal public policy and the common law definition of
"charity" to deny exemption to a private school "not having a racially nondiscriminatory
policy as to students." Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 CuMs. BULL. 230. See also Rev. Rul. 75-231,
1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 25, at 12 (private church-affiliated schools not maintaining a
racially nondiscriminatory policy do not qualify as "charitable" even if racial exclusion
i'. dictated by religious conviction). See generally Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S.
725, 748-49 (1974); Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the
Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972).
Another currently troublesome issue is whether the term "charitable" includes or-
ganizations that charge for their services and thereby either exclude persons who cannot
pay or absorb clients who might otherwise be served by taxable competitors. See Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing en bane
denied, 506 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 975 (1975) (hospital need
not provide free or below-cost service to qualify as "charitable"); Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2
Cvx. BULt. 162 (nonprofit organization making loans to ghetto businesses held exempt
under § 501(c)3) because of beneficial effect on community conditions, even though bor-
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nition would eliminate these residual problems of distinguishing be-
tween "charitable" and "noncharitable" purposes, save by an unending
process of amending the Code to settle every boundary dispute as it
arises.
Assuming, then, a large central core of meaning for the term "chari-
table purposes" despite its ambiguity at the edges, should such or-
ganizations be exempt from income taxation? The answer (and the
reason) was so self-evident to President Eliot of Harvard University
when he was called upon, in 1874, to comment on a proposal to revoke
Massachusetts's exemption laws that he responded with an arrogance
that has plagued the cause of tax exemption for charities ever since:
It is at once apparent that this objection [to tax exemption] is
both illogical and mean; illogical, because if churches, colleges
and hospitals subserve the highest public ends, there is no reason
for making them contribute to the inferior public charges; and
mean, because it deliberately proposes to use the benevolent af-
fections of the best part of the community as a means of getting
out of them a very disproportionate share of the taxes.84
Less smug advocates of the exemption often offer a defense of tax
exemption that is more modest than, and diametrically opposed to
President Eliot's-that most of the services supplied by private chari-
ties, if diminished in scale by taxation, would have to be replaced at
government expenses. By itself, however, this assertion-even if fac-
tually accurate-does not supply an affirmative reason for preserving
charities as an alternative; it establishes merely that both routes,
private and public, will take us to the same destination. The missing
link in the chain of reasoning is usually supplied by the claim that
private charitable organizations can discharge these quasi-governmental
functions with more imagination, diversity, flexibility, speed, and
economy than is usually displayed by public agencies.8 5
Lacking a method for measuring these appealing but elusive virtues,
one must perforce rely on intuition in comparing the achievements
of private charities with those of government, when they are perform-
rowers might not themselves qualify for charitable assistance); Rev. Ruls. 75-75 9- 75-76,
1975 INT. REv. Buts. No. 10, at 8, 9 (public interest law firm may accept fees awarded
or approved by court or administrative agency, but not regular fees from clients even
if rates are below those of private firms).
84. C. Eliot, The Exemption from Taxation, 1874 (paper delivered to the Commis-
sioners of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts), reprinted in CHARLEs IV. ELIOT, THE
MAN AND iS Buairs 667, 675 (V. Nielson ed. 1926).
85. For an eloquent statement of the values served by charitable and other nonprofit
institutions, see Stone, supra note 5, at 39-40. See also HousE CO.MM. ON WAYs AND
MEANS, 89TH1 CONG., IST SES., TREASURY DEP'T REPORT ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 12-14
(Comm. Print 1965); H. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19-20 (1938).
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ing similar functions. In our view, private institutions are characterized
by the advantages claimed for them, and also provide a standard against
which to measure the achievements of competing government agencies.
But this is not the place to seek to convert those who are skeptical
on this point, let alone those of a contrary persuasion.
In any event, it is our thesis that tax exemption for charitable or-
ganizations need not rest on these value judgments because it is in-
dependently and firmly grounded on the basic presuppositions of in-
come taxation: neither the "net income" concept nor the "ability t6
pay" rationale for income taxation can be satisfactorily applied to chari-
table organizations.8s If our analysis and conclusions are well founded,
the exemption of these organizations from income tax is not a prefer-
ence or a special favor,8 7 requiring affirmative justification, but an
organic acknowledgment of the appropriate boundaries of the income
tax itself.
B. Educational Institutions
Sections 501(c)(3) lists "educational purposes" as a basis for tax ex-
emption, but this is probably an unnecessary bit of specification. Since
the enactment of the Statute of Charitable Uses (1601), the statutory
term "charitable" has ordinarily been interpreted to include educa-
tional purposes and institutions.8 8 The Treasury Regulations expand
on the statutory term "educational purposes" as follows:
The term "educational", as cited in section 501(c)(3) relates to-
(a) The instruction or training of the individual for the pur-
pose of improving or developing his capabilities; or
(b) The instruction of the public on subjects useful to the
individual and beneficial to the community.8 9
In keeping with this definition, the Regulations go on to state that
the term "educational" embraces not only schools and colleges, but also
public discussion groups, instructional programs transmitted by radio
and television, museums, symphony orchestras, and similar organiza-
tions. Like other § 501(c)(3) organizations, an educational institution
forfeits its tax exemption if a "substantial part of [its] activities ...
is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legis-
lation" or if it participates or intervenes in "any political campaign
86. See pp. 307-16 supra.
87. See note 14 supra; Bittker & Kaufman, supra note 83.
88. The inability of segregated schools to qualify as "charitable," see note 83 supra,
implies that the "educational" exemption is not independent of the "charitable"
exemption.
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (1959).
HeinOnline -- 85 Yale. L.J. 333 1975-1976
The Yale Law Journal
on behalf of any candidate for public office." The impact of this re-
striction is outside the scope of this article,90 but it should be noted
here that the statutory distinction between permissible "educational"
and forbidden "propaganda" activities is not easily applied. Moreover,
in an elaboration containing an apparently independent constraint,
the Regulations provide:
An organization may be educational even though it advocates aparticular position or viewpoint so long as it presents a sufficiently
full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an in-
dividual or the public to form an independent opinion or con-
clusion. On the other hand, an organization is not educational
if its principal function is the mere presentation of unsupported
opinion.91
The rationale for exempting educational institutions from income
taxes is substantially the same as that for exempting other charitable
organizations. The principal difference, which is one of degree rather
than of kind, is that the students who attend exempt schools and
colleges and the patrons of museums, galleries, and orchestras probably
come from higher income classes than most of the beneficiaries of
other charitable organizations. Though this does not make it any easier
to compute the "net income" of educational organizations, it weakens
one argument in favor of exempting many other nonprofit organiza-
tions-that the burden of a tax would fall largely on persons at the
bottom of the income ladder.
We do not mean to imply, however, that students are the only
beneficiaries of the money spent by schools and colleges or that art
galleries and symphony orchestras are merely the playthings of the rich.
Only a philistine would doubt that these institutions provide benefits,
directly and indirectly, to an indefinably wide audience over the entire
income spectrum. 92 In his famous comment on the law of charities,
Lord MacNaughten asserted that activities are no less charitable in
90. See note 16 supra.
91. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(d)(3)(i) (1959). This distinction is reminiscent of an
ancient but still unresolved debate in an area of private law-whether trusts to promote
dogmatic, sectarian, political or subversive propaganda are protected by the Statute of
Charitable Uses or its latter day statutory offspring. See, e.g., IV A. Scorr, supra note
82, § 370.4, at 2875-76; 15 Ams. JuR. 2d Charities § 68, at 76-77 (1964); 2 REsTTEMENT
(SEcoND) TRusts § 370, at 252 (comment g); id. § 374, at 261 (comment e).
92. There is little risk, in today's America, that "education" will become the ex-
clusive province of effete intellectual snobs. See Mobile Arts & Sports Ass'n v. United
States, 148 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Ala. 1957), stating that:
The halftime shows put on [at football games] by the famed Rangerettes of Kilgore
College, Kilgore, Texas, and the Dixie Darlings of Mississippi Southern College,
Hattiesburg, Mississippi, provide entertainment with a flavoring of art, dancing and
music, and undoubtedly have some educational and publicity value.
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the eye of the law because incidentally they benefit the rich as well
as the poor, as indeed every charity must do either directly or indi-
rectly.' 3 Moreover, it is precisely in the area of education, including
the arts, that private institutions are especially well suited to serve as
independent centers of power and influence in our society, fostering
innovation and diversity with a dedication that government agencies
can seldom muster or sustain. This separate rationale for tax exemption
applies particularly to educational institutions.
C. Scientific Organizations
Like educational institutions, organizations which fulfill "scientific
purposes" might have been brought under the aegis of the exemption
for "charitable purposes" even if not explicitly listed in § 501(c)(3). 94
Congress did not leave the issue to the courts, however, and scientific
organizations have been included in the exempt category since 1913.95
The justification for exempting charitable organizations applies
equally to scientific organizations, given the statutory disqualification
of those whose net earnings inure to the benefit of private shareholders
or individuals and the requirement in the Regulations that the or-
ganization must serve "a public rather than a private interest." If
anything, the choice of a proper tax rate, were the exemption to be
repealed, would be even more difficult for most scientific organizations
than for other public service institutions, since the class of "benefi-
ciaries" who would bear the economic burden of such a tax might be
as broad as the nation, and embrace future generations as well as all
living persons. To be sure, some individuals and corporations are
able to profit currently from the research or other activities of ex-
empt scientific organizations; but they will be taxed on their income
as it arises (and on a "gross" basis since they will not be allowed to
deduct or amortize any part of the exempt organization's expenses
in developing the ideas or innovations used in the income-producing
business). If the exempt organization's research is open to commercial
exploitation on an equal basis by all comers, the fact that their in-
come will be taxed provides adequate assurance that the exemption
93. Commissioners for Special Purpose of Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531,
583. See also note 83 supra, regarding the status of "charitable" organizations which
charge for their services and thereby exclude indigent clients.
94. But see In re Association of the Bar v. Lewisohn, 34 N.Y.2d 143, 313 N.E.2d 30, 356
N.Y.S.2d 555 (1974) ("scientific" organizations not included in N.Y. statute granting tax
exemption to "charitable" and "educational" institutions). See also Brief for Respondents
in id. at 12.
95. Compare Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(G), 38 Stat. 172, with Revenue Act of
1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 113.
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will not permit private interests to escape their fair share of the
national tax burden.
D. "Public" and "Private" Charities-"Private Foundations"
Since 1950, Congress has distinguished for a variety of purposes be-
tween charitable organizations that, roughly speaking, are financed or
patronized by the public and those that are not.9 The evolution of
this distinction between "public" and "private" charities (to use non-
statutory, but roughly descriptive labels), which by now has become
extremely intricate, began in 1950, when the Internal Revenue Code
was amended to deny tax exemption to charities that engaged in "pro-
hibited transactions" (specified acts benefiting substantial contributors)
or whose undistributed income was unreasonably accumulated, used
to a substantial degree for nonexempt purposes, or invested in a man-
ner jeopardizing the exempt purposes. Without offering any explicit
rationale for doing so, Congress excepted churches, schools and col-
leges, hospitals, and certain publicly supported organizations from these
rules. By asserting that the new self-dealing rules were applicable to
organizations which are manipulated to the private advantage of their
substantial donors, the 1950 committee reports implied that charitable
organizations subjected to these rules were more prone to this type of
abuse than those exempted. At the same time, however, this suggestion
was watered down by the comment that "similar criteria" might be
used to determine whether other charitable organizations "are op-
erated exclusively for exempt purposes. '0 7
Thus, the 1950 legislation-which planted the seeds of today's full-
grown statutory distinctions between private foundations and other
charitable organizations-was based on a vague impression that foun-
dations were somewhat more susceptible than other organizations to
the abuses diagnosed by Congress, not on a firm conviction that disease
was rampant in one group and unknown to the other. But since the
new rules were replete with such words as "reasonable," "adequate,"
and "substantial," the legislation was hardly more than a congressional
instruction to the Internal Revenue Service to be especially alert to
96. For a more extended examination of the issues surveyed at pp. 336-42 infra,
see Bittker, Should Foundations Be Third-Class Charities?, in THE FUTURE OF FOUNDA-
TIONS 132 (F. Heimann ed. 1973). There is a detailed examination of the legislative
history of the distinction between public and private charities in L. WILLIAMS & D. MOORE-
HEAD, AN ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL TAX DISTINCTIONS BErWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS (Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs
(Filer Commission) 1975).
97. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 123-24 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 CuM.
BULL. 483, 571.
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the possibility of misfeasance or nonfeasance by private foundations,
while not overlooking similar behavior by other charitable organiza-
tions. Thus, it probably added little to the longstanding and over-
arching requirements, applied by § 501(c)(3) to all charitable organi-
zations, that they must be "organized and operated exclusively" for
the exempt purposes specified in the statute and must not allow any
part of their net earnings to inure to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual. 98
The process of distinguishing among charitable organizations, begun
by Congress on this modest scale in 1950, was accelerated in subse-
quent years. In 1954, when the ceiling on an individual taxpayer's
deduction for charitable contributions was raised from 20 percent of
adjusted gross income to 30 percent, the extra 10 percent allowance
could be used only if the donee was a church, school, or hospital. The
announced reason for raising the ceiling on gifts to these institutions
was "to aid [them] in obtaining the additional funds they need, in
view of their rising costs and the relatively low rate of return they
are receiving on endowment funds." 99 It is difficult to believe that
other operating charities were not feeling the same pinch; and in
1964, Congress acknowledged this by enlarging the charmed circle to
include "publicly or governmentally supported" charities.100
Charitable organizations qualifying for the extra 10 percent allow-
ance were also favored by two other provisions of the 1964 legislation:
contributions to them in excess of the donor's percentage ceiling quali-
fied for the newly enacted carryover of excess contributions of § 170(b)
(5) (now § 170(d)); and the unlimited charitable deduction of § 170(g)
was amended to favor contributions to these donees.
The 1954 and 1964 legislation seems to embody two distinctions,
resting on different rationales. The first is between "operating" and
"nonoperating" charities, based on the premise that those in the for-
mer category need special assistance in maintaining their activities at
98. See, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct.
Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970) (exemption denied to a church organization
where earnings inured to benefit of founder and his family in form of salaries, rentals,
reimbursements, and loans); Kenner v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1963), afj'g
20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 185 (1961) (exemption denied to a hospital owned and controlled
by one doctor, who commingled his funds with hospital's funds in one account and
used hospital funds for his personal expenses); Horace Heidt Foundation v. United
States, 170 F. Supp. 634 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (exernption denied to an organization formed to
help aspiring entertainers, where the organization was operated in part to maintain
popularity of founder's radio show and to reduce his expenses through employment of
such entertainers).
99. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1954).
100. S. RF'. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 58-59 (1964), reprinted in 1964-1 Cum.
BULL. 505, 562-63.
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accustomed levels (or expanding them) in the face of increased costs
and low yields on their endowments. Presumably it was thought that
nonoperating charities (especially foundations which make grants) have
fewer on-going commitments and hence can retrench or postpone their
undertakings more easily. The second distinction is between public
and private charities, evidently resting on a judgment that publicly
supported charities satisfy more pressing social needs than private
charities, or that public support amounts to an informal referendum
conferring an endorsement on some charities to the exclusion of others.
These separate rationales coincide in the case of many charitable
organizations. Hospitals, for example, are often supported by the pub-
lic and are burdened with continuing commitments that are not easily
scaled down; family foundations, conversely, are usually free to re-
trench when income is low, and often lack explicit public endorsement
in the form of contributions from a widespread body of benefactors.
But there are other cases in which the rationales conflict: some pri-
vately supported charities engage in day-to-day operations comparable
to those of publicly supported charities, and they may even have a
regular public patronage; conversely, some publicly supported chari-
ties are grant-making institutions. Churches, schools and colleges, and
hospitals, it should be noted, were favored by the 1950-1964 legislation
whether publicly supported or not; the nature of their activities, not
the source of their support, put them into the charmed circle.
Foundations engaged in making grants rather than in such "operat-
ing" activities as education, hospital care, and aid to the indigent drew
a sustained barrage of congressional criticism during the 1960's. A
much-publicized 1962 report to the House Select Committee on Small
Business, by its Chairman, Congressman Wright Patman, set out cer-
tain instances of misuse of funds and violations of law or Treasury
regulations by private foundations. The report also charged that pri-
vate foundations put the income from large amounts of capital beyond
the reach of taxation, operated businesses at a competitive advantage
vis-A-vis small businesses, enjoyed increasingly excessive economic
power, and lightened the tax burden of the rich.10'
Whether well founded or not, 0 2 these charges gained sufficient cur-
rency to culminate in 1969 in the imposition of a series of complex
restrictions on some nonprofit organizations, buttressed by a variety
of penalty taxes, in addition to the excise tax on their investment in-
101. CHAIRMAN, HOUSE SELECT CoMm. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 87TH CONG., lsr SEs., TAx
EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUStS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY (Comm.
Print 1962).
102. See Bittker, supra note 96.
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come discussed earlier in this article.103 Some of these restrictions and
taxes were wholly new; others were stricter versions of earlier measures.
The prime target was the "private foundation," defined by § 509 as
all § 501(c)(3) organizations except: (1) churches, schools, colleges, and
hospitals; (2) "publicly supported" charities, as described in § 170(b)
(1)(A); (3) "publicly patronized" charities normally receiving more
than one-third of their income from gifts, dues, service charges, etc.,
and less than one-third from investments; and (4) a few other groups
of less general significance. Moreover, some distinctions were drawn
by the 1969 legislation among the residual group of "private foun-
dations," with some being treated a bit more leniently than their
fellow culprits.10 4
Stripped of detail, the 1969 rules provide:
1. Self-dealing. Section 4941 imposes an absolute prohibition on
almost every conceivable transaction between a private foundation and
a "disqualified person" (broadly defined by § 4946 to include substan-
tial contributors, trustees and officers of the foundation, members of
their families, their business associates, and other related persons),
enforced by a graduated set of penalties on the disqualified person and
on any foundation manager who knowingly participated in the for-
bidden act.
2. Excess business holdings. Section 4943 imposes a tax of five per-
cent of the value of a private foundation's "excess business holdings
in a business enterprise," defined to mean, ordinarily, stock in excess
of an amount equal to 20 percent of the voting stock of a business
corporation minus the stock owned by disqualified persons. The foun-
dation is allowed a period of five to 20 years to dispose of excess
stock, depending on when the stock was acquired and on certain other
factors. An additional tax of 200 percent is imposed if the founda-
tion persists in retaining the stock after the prescribed correction
period. The announced reasons for this limitation were that concen-
trated charitable ownership of stock might enable the corporation
to compete unfairly with other corporations, whose shareholders are
taxed on their dividends, and could also lead foundation managers
to neglect their charitable obligations in order to focus on business
operations.
3. Risky investments. Section 4944, replacing an earlier restriction,
103. See p. 326 supra.
104. The details are outlined in a table by Sugarman, A Tax-Treatment Table for
Charitable Organizations Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, PRAc. Lmw., Mar. 10,
1970, at 85. This graphic display of the statutory distinctions drawn by the 1969 legis-
lation suggests that its draftsmen could have given lessons to the most talented of
theological hairsplitters.
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imposes a tax on any private foundation investing its funds "in such
a manner as to jeopardize the carrying out of any of its exempt pur-
poses," and a similar tax on any foundation manager guilty of "know-
ing" participation in such risky investing. The legislative reports do
not explain why this tax is imposed on private foundations but not
on other charitable organizations, nor do they offer any evidence that
foundations have been more prone than other nonprofit organizations
to jeopardize their exempt functions by risky investments.
4. Failure to distribute income. Section 4942 imposes a 15 percent
tax on the undistributed income of private nonoperating foundations-
roughly speaking, on their actual income or a specified percentage of
the value of their investment assets, 10 whichever is higher, less their
qualifying distributions for the year, and further reduced by amounts
set aside for specified projects with the approval of the Treasury and
by "excess" distributions carried over from prior years. 10 A second
tax, at the rate of 100 percent, is imposed if a failure to distribute
the requisite amount is not remedied within a prescribed correction
period, and there is a third level of penalties for more flagrant
violations.
The legislative reports on this provision do not explain why a
mandatory payout rule should be imposed on private foundations but
not on other charitable organizations. 0 7 The distinction presumably
rests on an implicit assumption that the budgets of schools and col-
leges, hospitals, and other "operating" charities compel them to use
their income currently and to avoid nonproductive investments, ex-
cept when the prospect of overriding future needs dictates the ac-
cumulation of reserves; but there seems to be no hard evidence to
support this speculation.
5. Disfavored grants and other expenditures. Section 4945 im-
poses a 10 percent tax on a private foundation's "taxable expenditures,"
defined as amounts paid or incurred for: (a) specified political activ-
ities; (b) grants to individuals, unless awarded on an objective basis
105. Under § 4942(e)(3), the Secretary of the Treasury may alter the percentage, ac-
cording to changes in the rate of return generally available in financial markets.
106. For the status of indefinite accumulations under prior law, see Erie Endowment
v. United States, 316 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1963); Stevens Bros. Foundation, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 324 F.2d 633, 640 (8th Cir. 1963) (accumulation of income served no "definite
functional objective"; exemption therefore revoked); Samuel Friedland Foundation v.
United States, 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956) (accumulation of income up to the level
necessary to construct a medical research building held reasonable). Before 1969 the
relevant statutory provisions were: INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 38, § 3814, 61 Stat. 958
(1950) (later INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 504, Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat.
168, repealed by Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, Tit. I, § 101(j)(15), 83
Stat. 527).
107. See p. 336 supra.
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(under a procedure approved in advance by the Treasury) as a scholar-
ship, fellowship, prize to a person selected from the general public,
or grant to achieve a specific intellectual or artistic objective; and
(c) grants to other private foundations (and certain other groups),
unless the granting foundation assumes "expenditure responsibility"
by supervising spending under the grant and reporting on the ex-
penditures to the Internal Revenue Service. The initial 10 percent
tax on taxable expenditures is buttressed by a tax on foundation man-
agers for willful violations, and by second and third level penalties if
corrective action is not taken within a prescribed period.
These restrictions reflect a miscellany of congressional objections
to the programs of a few foundations, including the financing of voter
registration activities and certain travel and study grants to some mem-
bers of President Kennedy's administration pending their relocation
in other posts after his assassination. Given this background, a search
for a principled justification for these statutory constraints, or for their
imposition on private foundations and not on other exempt organiza-
tions, is not likely to be fruitful. A realistic assessment, rather, com-
pels the conclusion that the general form of § 4945 only thinly dis-
guises its specific origin in a handful of grievances. 08
It is common knowledge that preachers sometimes divert church
funds to personal ends, that the nonprofit facade of a school or college
can mask a proprietary operation, that some hospitals serve primarily
to enrich their physician-entrepreneurs, and that some publicly sup-
ported charities allow most of their contributions to be siphoned off
by grasping fundraisers. It is equally clear, however, that these in-
stances did not-and should not-impel Congress to extend to the vast
body of charitable organizations the labyrinth of statutory restrictions,
108. Indeed, the elaborate skein of rules imposed on private foundations in 1969
was based-despite the abundance of congressional hearings and Treasury investigations
-on little more than isolated instances of. actual, alleged, or suspected misconduct by
a few foundations, coupled with a plethora of suggestions that these cases were typical
and that existing law "could" or "might" or "probably would" lead to abuses. Even more
conjectural was the unarticulated premise that foundations were more likely to succumb
to temptation than other charitable organizations. If the need to justify a distinction
between private foundations and other charities rose to the conscious level, it was
probably satisfied by contrasting the sins of the most errant foundations with the
reputations of the most scrupulous religious, educational, and publicly supported charities.
Tax scholars have called attention to special purpose tax legislation designed to aid
a handful of taxpayers (or even a single individual) cloaked in the language of generally
applicable legislation. Cary, Pressure Groups and the Revenue Code: A Requiem in
Honor of the Departing Uniformity of the Tax Laws, 68 HARV. L. REV. 745 (1955);
Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted,
70 HARV. L. Rxv. 1145 (1975). A parallel study of the punitive tax legislation in the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 would be equally valuable, and it might suggest to a post-Viet Nam
and post-Watergate generation of observers that the label "tax reform" can be exploited
as readily as "national security."
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navigable only by lawyers and accountants and guarded by penalties
far exceeding the civil penalties for deliberate tax fraud, which were
prescribed in 1969 for private foundations.
One wonders, therefore, whether it is quixotic to seek an explanation
for the "third-class" status of private foundations, as we have done,
in the congressional announcements that accompanied the legislation.
Perhaps it would be more realistic to attribute these restrictions to
skepticism or distrust of the very characteristics that are often extolled
as the virtues of the private foundation-its capacity to experiment
because it is usually free of permanent commitments and is controlled
by trustees answerable primarily to their own sense of responsibility.ltt'
Private organizations displaying independence, flexibility, and orig-
inality are bound to tread on toes, and when the toes belong to public
officials, an adverse legislative reaction should not come as a surprise.
This kind of backlash is encouraged-and, indeed, legitimated-by
the theory that the recipients of tax exemption enjoy the privilege of
spending "government money." At a recent conference on the con-
temporary role of foundations, they were urged to take advantage of
"their independence, their diversity, their freedom to pick their own
objectives and tasks, their resources, their ability to take the long view,
their immunity from pressure" in order to support projects "that are
profoundly critical, root and branch, of public policy and behavior."
But if foundations are, in truth, spending public money, it is fatuous
to expect Congress to tolerate expenditures devoted for causes that
challenge the established order." 0
E. Religious Organizations
Religious organizations share with charitable and educational or-
ganizations the distinction of having enjoyed tax exemption consis-
tently since the Revenue Act of 1894. Their exemptions (and the de-
ductions allowed contributors by § 170) raise an extremely wide range
of issues-from custom and practicality to constitutionality, and ul-
timately, teleology. Setting to one side the encumbrances of history",
and the concerns of the theologian, we wish to determine how religious
institutions fare under the theory expounded above" 2 that nonprofit
109. See HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 89T- CONG., 1ST SESS., TREASURY DrP'T
REPORT ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS; 12-13 (Comm. Print 1965). Bittker, supra note 96, at
160-61.
110. Address by David R. Hunter, 26th Annual Conference, Council on Foundations,
Chicago, Apr. 22, 1975.
111. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676-78, 681-86 (1970) (New York statute
exempting realty used for religious purposes from property tax is not an unconstitu-
tional sponsorship of religion).
112. See pp. 305-06 supra.
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organizations should not be viewed as independent taxpaying entities
generating "income," and should be taxed, if at all, only as proxies
for their contributors or members."13
Thorstein Veblen likened churches to business enterprises engaged
in the sale of promises and expectations:
Of such sacred sales-publicity concerns operating as certified
agents for this marketing of supernatural intangibles, the Census
of 1916 enumerates 202 chain-store organizations, comprising a
total of 203,432 retail establishments occupied exclusively with the
sale of such publicity to the ultimate consumers; of whom there
is one born every minute, and who are said to be carried on
the books of these retailers to the number of 41,926,854. It has
been confidently estimated, on the ground of these data, that
the effectual number of paying customers will be approximately
90,000,000; regard being had to the very appreciable floating clien-
tale and the great number of effectual consumers attached to and
associated with the customers of record."14
Viewed in this light, a church would realize profit or loss, depending
on whether its receipts exceeded its current expenses and depreciation
on its plant and equipment.
Another way of describing churches, less entertaining than Veblen's
but more congenial to the American public, is that they are voluntary
associations of their members to conduct activities that are no more
profit-oriented than the pooling of resources by a group of friends or
neighbors to establish a cooperative nursery school. If this analysis is
accepted, the contributions and dues paid by the church's members
would not be embraced even by an expansive definition of income.
As for dividends, interest, and other receipts from the church's en-
dowment funds, if they are classified as gross income for the group
(which is how the comparable investment income of the individual
members would be treated), it would then be necessary to decide wheth-
113. Some of the views set out here are advanced in greater detail in Bittker, supra
note 23.
114. T. VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES 323-24
(1923). Like other § 501(c)(3) organizations, churches are subject to the rule that no
income may inure to private individuals. By virtue of this requirement, "it is necessary
for an organization to establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of
... the creator or his family .... " Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (1959). In Founding
Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1009 (1970), the Court of Claims upheld the Commissioner's denial of exemption
to a church which enriched its earthly founder in an unusual fashion. The church
derived over 90 percent of its income from the sale, under contract, of "spiritual pro-
cessing" whereby "detrimental aberrations" were monitored by a device measuring changes
in the electrical resistance within the communicant's body. The founder, who had in-
vented the device, received royalties, and was paid a salary set at 10 percent of the
church's gross receipts.
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er the church's operating expenses are deductible expenses, an issue
examined earlier in this article. 115
If, resolving all debatable issues against the churches, we were to
include that their activities can produce "income" which should be
taxed to the organization or its members, we would then reach the
knotty problem of an appropriate tax rate. Do members derive benefits
from their church's activities that ought to be included in their income
but are excluded because of practical difficulties in making the im-
putation? In a secular society, the initial response to this question is
likely to be: "The church belongs to its parishioners and they are the
ones who benefit from its activities." If this response is accepted, the
church's income should be imputed to its parishioners; but if inappro-
priate imputation is not feasible-should more be allocated to pious
members than to lax ones?-the next best device would be to tax the
church, at a rate designed, if possible, to yield about the same amount
of income as an imputation to individuals. This could hardly be done
church-by-church, even though a regime of divergent tax rates would
better reflect the ability to pay of each church's average member than
a flat national figure. The only conceivable tax schedule, therefore,
and perhaps the only constitutional one, would be a flat rate that
would overtax churches with poor members while undertaxing those
catering to the rich.
Another view of religious activity, however, is that its benefits are
not intended for, or even primarily received by, its communicants,
who should instead be viewed as missionaries to a world that stands
in need, albeit unwittingly, of their work.116 Their claim to serve
the public interest, with little or no benefit to themselves, may be
received skeptically by the outsider, but is it less persuasive than the
same claim when advanced by contributors to the Red Cross, members
of the American Civil Liberties Union, or backers of the Socialist
Party? If secular nonprofit organizations are exempt from income
tax for the reasons canvassed earlier in this article, despite the psychic
income that their activities confer on their members, 117 can a nation
whose Constitution guarantees religious freedom properly deny the
115. See pp. 309-14 supra.
116. This alternative view of religious activity may be more suited to evangelical
groups than to those that do not seek to convert nonbelievers, but under the Constitu-
tion, all churches must be treated alike.
If the church uses investment income (as distinguished from dues) to provide secular
education or similar services to its members, of course, the most appropriate treatment
would be an imputation of the income thus used to those receiving the benefits. See
pp. 349-51 infra.
117. See note 15 supra.
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same exempt status to religious organizations on the theory that they
are more tinctured by self-interest than secular organizations?
A final issue is the effect of the establishment clause of the First
Amendment on the tax exemption accorded to religious institutions.
If nonprofit organizations do not have "income" in the ordinary sense,
as we have argued, their exemption from income taxation is not
properly classified as "government aid" raising an establishment clause
problem; it is, rather, a normal or even inevitable corollary of the
economic and philosophical foundation on which the income tax itself
rests. Even if this theory of income taxation is rejected, and the ex-
emption of churches is regarded as government assistance to them,""'
it may be permissible under the establishment clause so long as church-
es are not singled out for special treatment but are, rather, incidental
beneficiaries of a rule applied impartially to a wide range of other
nonprofit institutions."9 Indeed, taxing churches while exempting
the secular organizations that compete with them in the marketplace
of ideas for the hearts and minds of man might collide with the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment.12 0
F. Social Welfare Organizations
Nonprofit organizations "operated exclusively for the promotion of
social welfare" are exempted from income taxation by Section 501(c)
(4)." -" The regulations flesh out the term "social welfare" by stating
that:
118. The exemption of churches is not listed as a "tax expenditure" in the 1976
federal budget. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 14, at 108-09. See
generally note 14 supra.
119. For a detailed examination of the establishment clause issue, see Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Bittker, supra note 23.
120. Cf. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), and Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333 (1970), involving the scope of the exemption from the draft granted by Congress
to persons conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of
"religious training and belief." The draft exemption was held to embrace a number
of conscientious objectors whose convictions were not based on orthodox religious grounds.
The cases were concerned at one level with the intended scope of the legislation, but
the opinions are replete with both implicit and explicit references to the establishment
clause, leading to the conclusion that a statutory distinction between "religious" and
"secular" objections to war might be unconstitutional.
121. The statutory phrase is "[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit
but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare .... ." To the effect that
the introductory adjective "civic" does not confine the exemption to municipal or
community-sponsored groups, see Peoples Educ. Camp Soc'y, Inc. v. Commissioner, 331
F.2d 923, 929-30 (2d Cir. 1964). But see Commissioner v. Lake Forest, Inc., 305 F.2d 814
(4th Cir. 1962) (holding that a cooperative nonprofit corporation organized to purchase
and own a housing project in which its members resided did not promote "social wel-
fare" because the benefits did not inure to the public at large). But cf. Eden Hall Farm v.
United States, 389 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (vacation home for "working girls and
women" endowed by the executive of a business corporation qualifies under § 501(c)(4)
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An organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of so-
cial welfare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way
the common good and general welfare of the people of the com-
munity. An organization embraced within this section is one which
is operated primarily for the purpose of bringing about civic bet-
terments and social improvements. 122
As defined, "social welfare" is similar to "charitable purposes" as that
term is used in § 501(c)(3), 123 and there is a substantial degree of
overlapping between the two provisions.124 The two statutory pro-
visions are saved from complete redundancy, however, by the exclusion
of "action organizations" from § 501(c)(3). 12 5 Thus, a nonprofit or-
ganization can qualify under § 501(c)(4) even though it has forfeited
its § 501(c)(3) exemption by such "action organization" activities as
attempting to influence legislation by propaganda, by pursuing ob-
jectives that can be attained only by the enactment of legislation, or
by campaigning for the attainment of its objectives rather than engag-
ing in nonpartisan analysis and making the results of its research avail-
able to the public.12 6
This "action organization" distinction between § 501(c)(3) and §
501(c)(4) organizations is a creature of the Treasury Regulations, with
no explicit sanction in either the statute or its legislative history, but
it is not easy to find other criteria separating the two categories.2 7
even though 80 percent of occupancy was by employees of the corporation and remaining
20 percent by their invited guests and others). See also Erie Endowment v. United States,
316 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1963).
Section 501(c)(4) also embraces a limited class of local employee associations devoting
their net earnings to charitable, educational or recreational purposes. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(4)-I(b) (1959).
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (1959).
123. See Amdur, Tax Exemption of Social Welfare Organizations, 45 TAX.ES 292 (1967);
Hopkins, The Social Welfare Organization under the Internal Revenue Code, Ppc.
LAw., Oct. 1971, at 15.
124. Indeed, the term "charitable" is defined by Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) to
include the "promotion of social welfare" by charitable or similar activities. But see
Rev. Rul. 57-493, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 314, ruling that a nonprofit corporation organized
to construct and lease a stadium to a school district, the title to which would eventually
vest in the district, was not a § 501(c)(3) organization, but qualified under § 501(c)(4); and
that contributions to it could be deducted under § 170(c)(1) (gifts to governments and
political subdivisions, if for exclusively public purposes).
125. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-I(a)(2)(ii) (1959). For another distinction between
§ 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organizations, see note 127 infra.
126. But see note 130 infra.
127. But see Erie Endowment v. United States, 316 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1963), where a
nonprofit corporation whose income was eventually to be spent for charitable purposes
was denied a § 501(c)(3) exemption because the trustees were obligated to accumulate
income in a manner held to be unreasonable under the now repealed § 5041. When the
organization then sought an exemption under § 501(c)(4), the court held that it was not
"a community movement designed to accomplish community ends" as required by
§ 501(c)(4), because it was created and dominated by one man. (These aspects of its
346
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The principal operational difference is that donors may deduct con-
tributions to § 501(c)(3) organizations, but not those to § 501(c)(4)
organizations. 128 When the sole issue is the exemption of the organi-
zation's own income, however, it does not matter whether it is clas-
sified as a "charitable" or a "social welfare" organization; both are
exempt, except for their unrelated business income. Thus, a chari-
table organization that is expelled from § 501(c)(3) for advocating
the adoption or rejection of legislation will ordinarily be entitled to
an exemption under § 501 (c)4), though contributions to it will no
longer be deductible by the donors. 129 Looking solely to the statute,
one might draw the same inference about a charitable organization
that participated in a political campaign, an activity that is explicitly
forbidden by § 501(c)(3) but not by § 501(c)(4). But the Regulations
state that this activity does not constitute "the promotion of social
welfare," and the Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that
any campaign activity is a bar to exemption.130
The tax exemption accorded to social welfare organizations rests on
substantially the same grounds as the exemption of charitable or-
ganizations. Since their objectives largely overlap, it would be as
difficult to measure the "income" of the one as of the other, and
since the beneficiaries of both are unidentifiable members of the
public at large, there would be equal difficulty in prescribing an
appropriate tax rate even if the income of either could be satisfac-
torily defined and computed. Finally, the policy reasons canvassed
organization and operation would not have been a barrier to an exemption under
§ 501(c)(3) if its other conditions had been met.) Had Erie Endowments gone the other
way, the statutory denial by the now repealed § 504 and its statutory predecessor (§ 3814
of the 1939 Code, applicable to taxable years 1951-1969) of a § 501(c)(3) exemption to
charitable organizations that unreasonably accumulated income would have served, in
practice, only to prevent contributors from deducting their gifts to such organizations;
the organizations themselves would have continued to be tax-exempt by virtue of
§ 01(c)4).
Former § 504 and its statutory predecessor also denied tax exempt status to § 501(c)(3)
organizations if they engaged in prohibited business transactions with certain related
persons, and they were taxed on unrelated business income. § 501(c)(4) organizations
were not subject to these disabilities.
128. § 170(c). But see Rev. Rul. 57-493, 1957-2 Cumt. BULL. 314. When a contribution
to a § 501(c)(4) organization can qualify as a business expense, however, the amount of
the donor's deduction is not restricted by § 162(b); to this limited extent, § 501(c)(4)
organizations may be better off than § 501(c)(3) organizations.
129. But see Rev. Rul. 57-494, 1957-2 Cuss. BULL. 315, asserting that an organiza-
tion cannot qualify under § 501(c)(4) if it falls within § 501(c)(9)'s purview (certain em-
ployee groups), but does not meet all of its requirements. Some of the impetus for this
position may have been reduced in 1969 when § 501(c)(4) organizations were subjected
to the unrelated business income tax, thus eliminating one comparative advantage of
classification as a social welfare organization. See also Erie Endowment v. United States,
316 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1963).
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-I(a)(2)(ii) (1959). For the status of political organizations,
see pp. 328-30 supra.
347
HeinOnline -- 85 Yale. L.J. 347 1975-1976
The Yale Law Journal
earlier' 31 are equally applicable to § 501(c)(4) organizations. Indeed,
since current law permits social welfare groups to seek the enactment
or repeal of legislation, they may be even more effective than chari-
table organizations as independent centers of power in a bureau-
cratized society.
III. Mutual Benefit Organizations
In general terms, mutual benefit organizations are operated to pro-
vide goods and services to their members at cost. Any excess of gross
revenues over costs may appear to violate this purpose, but since they
do not endeavor to generate profits from membership patronage, a
year-end surplus could be viewed as an overcharge which, if promptly
refunded to the members, should not be classified as "income." This
is in fact how patronage refunds by consumers' cooperative societies
are treated, reflecting the fact that the society would have had nothing
resembling "income" if it had reduced its prices in order to avoid a
year-end surplus. 132 And since actual price reductions would have pre-
vented the society from having any income, one might favor the same
tax-free result if the "overcharges" are retained by the mutual society
to benefit the members in future years by permitting charges to be
reduced or facilities to be expanded without additional cost. Alterna-
tively-but with the same nontaxable result-a mutual society's "profit"
from membership patronage might be regarded as a deposit or capital
contribution 1 33 by the members to finance future activities or facili-
131. See p. 332 supra.
132. §§ 1381-1388. Farmers' cooperatives and similar groups for the joint marketing
of their members' products seem to be a special case, but can be subjected to a similar
analysis. For each member, the spread between the cost of raising his crop and the price
received by the marketing coop can be appropriately regarded as income, whether it is
distributed to him or retained, with his consent, to expand the cooperative's facilities
or reduce its expenses in future years. The organization as such is best viewed as a
conduit, which would realize nothing resembling "income" if it could accurately predict
and deduct its expenses from the amounts remitted to its members, and borrow from
them any amounts needed to acquire or construct buildings, equipment, and other facili-
ties. Alternatively, the organization could be viewed-with similar tax consequences-as a
partnership, the results of whose operation should be imputed to its members. See also
note 140 infra; Logan, Federal Income Taxation of Farmers' and Other Cooperatives, 44
TExAs L. REv. 250 & 1269 (1965, 1966); Klein, supra note 14, at 31-34.
For a similar analysis of mutual insurance companies, disentangling the customer,
creditor, and shareholder aspects of the policyholder's relationship to the company, see
Clark, The Federal Income Taxation of Financial Intermediaries, 84 YALE L.J. 1603,
1657-63 (1975).
133. But see Edison Club, P-H TAx CT. REP. & IENM. DEC. (Tax Ct. Mem.) ff 75,019
(1975), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Edison Club v. Commissioner, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
ff 9186 (2d Cir., Dec. 8, 1975) (rejecting the argument that unexpended amounts paid
by members as "dues" or "assessments" are excludable from taxable income as capital
contributions under § 118).
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ties. If the members of a commune estimate their expenses for food at
$500 per person and pay this amount in advance to their purchasing
agent, one would not expect the group, as an entity, to realize income
if the cost turned out to be only $450 per person, even if the excess
was retained for the commune's future needs rather than refunded
to the members. To classify the excess as income would be tantamount
to taxing the members because they were astute shoppers or because
they performed unpaid services for the society.
Much could be said for a comprehensive statutory rule embodying
the foregoing rationale, but-as is often true of the Internal Revenue
Code-Congress has preferred piecemeal legislation to broad generali-
zations. Similarly, Congress did not prescribe a set of across-the-board
rules governing the investment income, profit-oriented activities and
transactions with nonmembers, of mutual benefit organizations, but
instead established many divergent taxing systems, which turn on such
variables as the organization's size, function, history, and occupational
or geographic characteristics. The most important categories of mutual
benefit organizations are discussed hereafter.
A. Social Clubs
Clubs organized and operated exclusively "for pleasure, recreation,
and other nonprofitable purposes" have been exempt since 191 6 .133
As originally enacted, the exemption was denied if any part of the club's
net earnings inured to the benefit of any "private shareholder or mem-
ber." In 1924, the word "member" was excised from this restriction, 135
and the door was opened to two substantial tax advantages: the build-
up of a tax-free endowment, and the exemption from tax of profits
derived from dealings with nonmembers.
First, the members of a social club could build up its capital with
their initiation fees and dues, immunizing the income generated by
these contributions from tax, even though it served to reduce the club's
charges to its members in later years. Of course, if the dues and fees
134. See generally Moffett, The Problem of Section 501(cX7) Organizations, 54 TAxES
4 (1976).
135. The cases and rulings continue to refer to benefits which inure to "members"
but they can be construed as saying no more than such benefits are a sign that the
club in question is not operated exclusively for "pleasure, recreation, and other non-
profitable purposes." Thus, Rev. Rul. 70-42, 1970-1 CuM. BULL. 132, denied tax exempt
status under § 501(c)(7) to a flying club whose sole activity was "rendering flying services
to its members," and in which there was "no significant commingling of its members."
Cf. Rev. Rul. 74-30, 1974-1 Cum. BULL. 137, granting tax exempt status to a flying club
where there was "constant person-to-person association among the members." Rev. Rul.
70-32 was distinguished by the fact that in that case "the club was operated primarily
as a service to members, rather than for the pleasure and recreation of members."
See also Spokane Motorcycle Club v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 151 (E.D. Wash. 1963).
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were invested in such assets as a golf course or a clubhouse, the use
of the exempt organization to acquire these properties would not re-
sult in a tax savings for the members, because if the members in-
vested in recreational or social property individually or as joint tenants
rather than through a "conduit" organization, their ownership and
use of these facilities would not itself create taxable income. But if
the club converted the contributions into income-producing endow-
ment, it got an exemption that was not available to the members as
individuals. In effect, therefore, they could earmark part of their own
income-producing capital to be used, free of income taxes, to pay for
their pleasure or recreation.' 36 Second, social clubs enjoyed an even
more dramatic advantage in that profits generated by their transactions
with nonmembers were also exempt from tax, despite use of these prof-
its to reduce the fees paid by members or to provide better facilities
without cost to them.
Before 1969, when this state of affairs was drastically altered by
legislation, the courts intervened from time to time to limit the scope
of these tax advantages. Although the adjective "social" is a label
rather than an operative statutory phrase, the statutory term "club," in
conjunction with the Code's references to "pleasure" and "recreation,"
was held to require "some sort of commingling of members," with
the result that groups like automobile clubs serving a mutual interest
without social contact among the members were held not to qualify. 1-
7
The courts found another restraint in the statutory requirement that
a club be operated exclusively for "nonprofitable purposes," which
was interpreted to disqualify clubs with excessive amounts of income
from nonmembership patronage or separate business activities. 138 Even
if a social club avoided these pitfalls, however, the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 substantially reduced its tax advantages by expanding the
136. A nonexempt club might attempt to achieve the same result, by using endow-
ment or business income to reduce its charges to members for their use of its social
facilities, and deducting the maintenance expenses under § 162, in a manner remi-
niscent of the incorporated country estates and yachts that gave rise to § 543(a)(6) of the
personal holding company provisions. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION OF CoaroRATiONS & SHAREHOLDERS ff 8.22, at 8-44, ff 8.20, at 8-34 (3d ed. 1971). This
gambit has been ended by the enactment of § 277 in 1969; for its relation to pre-1969
law, see Adirondack League Club, 55 T.C. 796 (1971), afrd per curian, 458 F.2d 506
(2d Cir. 1972) (deductions for social facilities allowed only to the extent of income
from members).
137. Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957); Keystone Auto. Club v.
Commissioner, 181 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1950); Chattanooga Auto. Club v. Commissioner,
182 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1950). See also note 135 supra; §§ 277, 456(c); S. REX. No. 91-552,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 CuM. BULL. 423, 471-72.
138. United States v. Fort Worth Club, 345 F.2d 52, modified on other grounds, 348
F.2d 891, (5th Cir. 1965). See also Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States, 388 F. Supp.
1269 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
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reach of the tax on "unrelated business taxable income." With minor
exceptions, a social club's income from investments and from non-
member patronage is now taxable. 39
As a consequence of the 1969 changes, the major significance of a
social club's exemption at present is that it is not taxed on "profits"
arising from goods, facilities, and services furnished to members and
their dependents and guests. This residual tax advantage is minimal,
if the club is regarded as a true association of its members, since any
profit from one year's operations will at most be used to reduce mem-
bership charges in another year. A relentless search for income in this
context, of course, would disclose that some members derive an eco-
nomic advantage from expenditures by their fellow members. Thus,
if the club's sole charge is an annual membership fee, those who use
the club's facilities frequently are subsidized by the other members,
just as a trencherman benefits from splitting a restaurant bill equally
after dining with a group of abstemious friends. But if the friends'
overpayment is subjected to analysis, it qualifies as a tax-free gift to
the person paying less than his true share of the bill. Perhaps the
benefits accruing to a member of a social club who pays less than his
share of its costs, at the expense of members paying more than their
share, can also be characterized as a gift, even though the bonds of
affection among the members are more attenuated than is customary
in the case of most gifts.
B. Consumers' Cooperatives and Similar Organizations
The Internal Revenue Code contains a single set of rules to govern
the tax treatment of two quite different types of cooperative societies
-consumers' cooperatives, organized primarily to supply food and other
household goods to their members; and marketing cooperatives, or-
ganized by farmers, dairymen, and other producers to market their
agricultural products. The far greater economic importance of mar-
keting cooperatives, coupled with a risk that agricultural profits may
slip untaxed through a statutory crevice between the cooperative and
its members, has given rise to elaborate provisions to ensure that all
income will be reported by one or the other of these potential tax-
payers.140 The tax status of consumers' cooperatives emerges almost
as an afterthought from the same network of rules.
139. § 512(a)(3). See Rev. Proc. 71-17, 1971-1 Cumt. BuLL. 683, prescribing audit guide-
lines to determine the amount of a social club's nonmembership receipts, as a prelude
to deciding whether its tax exemption has been forfeited and, if not, its tax under§ 512(a)(3); Horn, Unrelated Business Income of Social Clubs, 49 TAxEs 738 (1971).
140. §§ 1381-1388. See note 132 supra. The "exemption" conferred by § 521 on many
of these marketing cooperatives is something of a misnomer; they are treated much like
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Under the basic statutory scheme, as applied to consumers' coop-
eratives, the organization enjoys no explicit tax exemption; but it
is allowed to exclude patronage dividends from its taxable income.
These distributions are not taxed to the members, on the theory that
they represent belated reductions in the cost of household goods. 141
The net effect is that the organization is taxed in full on income from
business with nonmembers; it is taxed on transactions with its mem-
bers only to the extent that overcharges are not refunded, and it can
reduce its taxable income from membership transactions by either
charging less or refunding more. Earnings from membership patronage
retained by the organization to provide working capital or expand
its facilities, however, are subject to tax, even though, as suggested
earlier, they might be appropriately exempted on the ground that
they represent savings by the members to reduce their future living
expenses. 142
Although they perform substantially the same functions as con-
sumers' cooperatives, various other organizations are granted blanket
tax exemption (save for their unrelated business income) by the In-
ternal Revenue Code. This miscellaneous group of exempt organi-
zations includes:
1. Fraternal lodges and employee associations providing life,
sickness, accident, or other benefits to members and de-
pendents.143
2. Local life insurance associations, and mutual irrigation, tele-
phone, and similar companies, if at least 85 percent of their
income is paid by members to defray expenses and losses.144
3. Cemetery companies operated for the benefit of their mem-
bers, or not for profit. 45
conduits through which the members sell their goods, patronage dividends being excluded
from the organization's income but taxed to the members. Because the basic statutory
principle is "conduit" treatment rather than true tax exemption, these cooperatives are
comparable to trusts and Subchapter S corporations, and the statutory rules effectuating
this basic policy are outside the scope of this article. See generally A.C. Picou, Ess.YS IN
APPLiED ECONOMICS ch. XIII (2d ed. 1924) (Income Tax and Co-operative Societies); I.
PACKREL, THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF COOPERATIVES (4th ed. 1970).
141. Note that the member is not taxed on the patronage refund even if the society
lost money on its sales to him and is able to distribute a dividend only because it
made money on transactions with other members. Compare the treatment of members of
a social club, discussed supra.
142. See note 132 supra.
143. §§ 501(c)(8) (fraternal beneficiary societies), 501(c)(9) (voluntary employees' bene-
ficiary associations).
See also § 501(c)(10) (added in 1969 to provide an exemption for the Masons and
similar groups); S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 71-73 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3
CuM. BULL. 428, 470.
144. § 501(c)(12).
145. § 501(c)(13). See John D. Rockefeller Family Cemetery Corp., 63 T.C. 355 (1974)
(family nonprofit cemetery corporation qualifies for exemption; no requirement that it
be open to the public).
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4. Credit unions.' 46
5. Insurance companies (primarily fire and casualty compa-
nies), whose premiums and investment income do not exceed
$150,000.147
Profits accruing to these organizations from membership patronage,
which is probably the sole or dominant source of their income in most
cases, qualify for exemption under the rationale outlined above for
exclusion of the patronage dividends of cooperatives. Income from
investment or nonmembership patronage, however, would not be im-
mune from tax under this conduit rationale, and the statutory exemp-
tion of income from these sources probably reflects benign neglect more
than thoughtful attention. 48
C. Labor Unions
Section 501(c)(5) exempts "labor organizations" in unqualified lan-
guage, carrying forward a provision of the Revenue Act of 1913.149
The Regulations state that the organization's net earnings must not
inure to the benefit of any member, a restriction of doubtful validity
146. § 501(c)(14)(A).
147. § 501(c)(15).
148. In addition to consumer cooperatives, agricultural and horticultural organizations
have been consistently included in the statutory list of exempt organizations since 1913.
Although the statute does not describe these organizations further, the Regulations state
that their objectives must be "the betterment of the conditions of those engaged in such
pursuits, the improvement of the grade of their products, and the development of a
higher degree of efficiency in their respective occupations" and that they must not
allow their net earnings to inure to the benefit of their members. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(5)-
l(a) (1958).
Given these limitations, organizations qualifying under § 501(c)(5) have much in com-
mon with business leagues, exempt under § 501(c)(6), and with social welfare organizations,
exempt under § 501(c)(4). But see Consumer Farmer Milk Coop., Inc. v. Commissioner,
186 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 931 (1951) (farmer's cooperative not
exempt under predecessor of § 501(c)(4)); cf. Scofield v. Rio Farms, Inc., 205 F.2d 68
(5th Cir. 1953) (corporation aiding low income farmers exempt as a social welfare
organization).
Since the agricultural and horticultural organizations qualifying under § 501(c)(5)
would probably otherwise meet the tests of § 501(c)(6) or, in some instances, § 501(c)(4),
their inclusion in § 501(c)(5) seems a harmless bit of statutory specificity. There is, how-
ever, no reason why agriculture and horticulture should be signaled out for special men-
tion in the Code, which makes no mention of other occupational areas.
Farmers' cooperatives, whether engaged in purchasing supplies and equipment for their
members or in marketing their produce, are subject to special rules. See p. 351 supra.
Hence the organizations qualifying under § 501(c)(5) are probably of minor importance.
The few published rulings refer to the sponsorship of county fairs, improvement of live-
stock, and soil testing as appropriate objectives of these organizations. See Campbell v. Big
Spring Cowboy Reunion, 210 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1954); East Tenn. Artificial Breeders Ass'n
v. United States, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5848 (E.D. Tenn. 1963); Rev. Rul. 66-179, 1966-1
CuNi. BULL. 139; Rev. Rul. 56-245, 1956-1 Cumt. BULL. 204; Rev. Rul. 55-230, 1955-1
Cust. BULL. 71; Rev. Rul. 54-282, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 126 (1939 Code).
149. See Albert & Hansell, The Tax Status of the Modern Labor Union, 111 U. PA. L.
REv. 137 (1962).
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unless loosely construed, since the statutory provision must have been
intended, and has been consistently interpreted, to exempt labor unions
engaged in collective bargaining on behalf of their members.a ° The
prohibition is also virtually retracted by another part of the Regula-
tions themselves, conditioning the exemption on the organization's
dedication to "the betterment of the conditions" of its membership.lal
Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service has ruled that unions do not
lose their exemption by paying sickness, death, accident, or other bene-
fits to members. In revoking an earlier ruling to the contrary, the
Service said that "labor organizations were exempted for the very
reason that they operated, in part, as mutual benefit organizations
providing [such] benefits to their members."' 52
Approached ab initio, the exemption of labor unions is best exam-
ined in the context of the principles governing business expenses.
Dues paid by a union member are deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses under § 162 because the organization serves as his
collective bargaining agent in a profit-seeking endeavor and in other-
wise seeking to improve his conditions of employment.?53 If the dues
are not immediately spent by the union, but are invested and retained
for future contingencies (in a strike fund, for example), the member's
share of the union's investment income might be imputed back to
him. But then the member should be allowed an offsetting deduction
when the income so imputed is later spent by the organization on his
behalf, because he could deduct similar expenditures from his own
private (and taxable) investment income.
As in the case of business leagues,1 54 exempting the organization's
accumulated income is the equivalent of currently imputing its in-
come to its members but allowing them to deduct these amounts
when they are ultimately used by the union, except that the time
value of the money slips past the tax collector. Alternatively, if the
union's accumulated income permits dues to be reduced in future years
(or activities to be expanded without additional cost to the member-
150. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(5)-1(a)(1) (1958). See Rev. Rul. 73-411, 1973-2 CuM. BULL.
180, to the effect that in employink "popular names in describing [exempt] organizations
. . . such as 'labor organizations' . . . Congress is presumed to have had reference to
organizations as they actually exist and are commonly known."
151. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(5)-1(a)(2) (1958).
152. Rev. Rul. 62-17, 1962-1 GoCu. BuLL. 87, revoking Rev. Rul. 58-143, 1958-1 CuM.
BuLL. 239.
153. See note 20 supra. If the dues are spent by the union on activities that would
not generate deductions for the members if financed directly by them (rather than for
activities advancing their occupational interests), the case for a § 162 deduction is pro
tanto weakened. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(c)(3) (1965), amended by T.D. 6996, 1969-1
CNin. BuLL. 88.
154. See pp. 356-57 infra.
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ship), the fact that the members will deduct a smaller amount for
dues in these years than if they paid in full for the union's activities
will compensate the Treasury, albeit belatedly, for the revenue lost by
exempting the union's income when realized-again, except for the
time value of the money.15
D. Business Leagues
Since 1913, business leagues, chambers of commerce, and boards of
trade have been exempt from income taxation if not organized for
profit and if their net earnings do not inure to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual. Real estate boards were added to
the statutory list in 1928 and professional football leagues in 1966.a5
Trade associations are the most common instances of exempt "business
leagues," along with professional groups like the American Bar Asso-
ciation and the American Medical Association.
For most qualifying organizations, the statutory prohibitions of
§ 501(c)(6) against a profit orientation and the inurement of net earn-
ings to private benefit must be loosely interpreted, as was no doubt in-
tended by Congress from the outset. Strictly construed, these limits
would close the door to organizations serving the business interests
of an industry, since these activities inure to the benefit of their profit-
motivated members. Such a construction would confine § 501(c)(6) to
organizations not in need of its protection-those devoted to the general
welfare of society, which qualify for exemption as charitable or social
welfare organizations under § 501(c)(3) or (4). The statutory prohibi-
tions of § 501(c)(6), therefore, have not been interpreted to preclude
the commonly understood objectives of chambers of commerce and
similar organizations.
As summarized by the Regulations, the activities of a business league
should be directed to the improvement of business conditions of
one or more lines of business as distinguished from the perfor-
mance of particular services for individual persons. An organiza-
tion whose purpose is to engage in a regular business of a kind
ordinarily carried on for profit, even though the business is con-
155. But see note 153 supra. Since the membership's composition changes over time,
the group to whom the union's investment income would be imputed is not identical
with the group that will benefit from future lower dues. As pointed out earlier (p. 350
supra), there is a similar disparity in the case of social clubs.
156. § 501(c)(6). The 1966 committee reports do not disclose why baseball was not
given the same treatment as football. If the House Committee on Un-American Activi-
ties were still on the warpath, surely it would want to investigate this disparagement of
our national sport.
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ducted on a cooperative basis or produces only sufficient income
to be self-sustaining, is not a business league . 157
In administration, the interpretative problems under § 501(c)(6) have
primarily concerned the boundary between business leagues and tax-
able joint business ventures. Although § 501(c)(6) does not by any
means impose a high standard of altruism, it has been held to exclude
organizations created by business competitors to coordinate or cen-
tralize their advertising or purchasing activities, engage in research
for their exclusive benefit, furnish credit reports and collect delin-
quent accounts, or otherwise advance their special business interests;
§ 501(c)(6) does require some showing of benefit to the public.'"S Less
frequently, it is necessary to decide whether a business league's devo-
tion to the public interest so outweighs its service to its membership
as to justify classification as a charitable or educational organization.1 '
Charitable status is ordinarily of minor importance, however, since
tax exemption as a business league is usually as satisfactory as exemp-
tion under § 501(c)(3). To be sure, the latter status permits gifts to
be deducted by the donors as charitable contributions, but this is no
more (and, occasionally, less) advantageous than deducting them as
157. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1958). For the exclusion of associations engaged in a
business of a type ordinarily carried on for profit, see Credit Bureau of Greater New
York, Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1947). See also note 160 infra.
The major current interpretative issues arising under § 501(c)(6) are: (1) whether ac-
crediting organizations belong under § 501(c)(6) or § 501(c)(3); (2) whether the provision
of low cost life insurance to the members of a business league at a profit generates
unrelated business income for the organization; (3) whether organizations of merchants
in a shopping center to centralize their advertising qualify under § 501(c)(6); (4) whether
the protection and promotion of an industry trademark is consistent with § 501(c)(6)
status; and (5) the proper treatment of income from trade shows and publications spon-
sored by a business league. See Donald C. Alexander, Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Remarks before American Society of Association Executives, New Orleans, La., Aug. 29,
1973; American Plywood Ass'n v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Wash. 1967)
(quality control and trademark promotional activities, although they may not be exempt
activities per se, are consistent with § 501(c)(6) exemption if -iincidental" to a main
purpose which justifies exemption); Rev. Rul. 75-516, 1975 IrNT. REv. BULL. No. 48, at 18
(exempt organization's rental of display space at convention qualifies on the basis of the
informational value of exhibits and a "no sales or order-taking" clause in the rental
agreements); Rev. Rul. 73-411, 1973-2 Cuss. BUL. 180 (shopping center merchants' asso-
ciation to promote membership's business interests does not qualify).
158. See Medical Diagnostic Ass'n, 42 B.T.A. 610, 616-17 (1940); Glass Container Indus.
Research Corp. v. United States, 70-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. i 9214 (W.D. Pa. 1970). For a
broad reading of the public benefit test, see Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' Ass'n, Inc. v. United
States, 369 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1966), not acquiesced in, Rev. Rul. 68-182, 68-1 CU.-. BULL.
263.
159. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-146, 1974-1 Cum. BULL. 129 (organization which accredits
schools, including a small number of proprietary schools, is exempt under § 501(c)(3));
Rev. Rul. 68-373, 1968-2 Cuss. BULL. 206 (nonprofit organization engaged in testing drugs
for pharmaceutical companies; held, not exempt under § 501(c)(3)).
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business expenses under § 162.160 While charitable status would be
preferred to a § 501(c)(6) exemption if gifts are sought from exempt
foundations or other nonmember donors, a business league could ob-
tain deductible contributions by organizing an affiliated entity devoted
solely to its charitable objectives. An example is the American Bar
Association's American Bar Endowment.
Once it is recognized that § 501(c)(6) organizations ordinarily serve
the business objectives of their members, the justification for their
statutory exemption is exposed as rickety. There would be no great
difficulty in applying familiar principles of income computation to
their activities, nor in fixing an appropriate level of taxation for an
organization whose membership is composed of corporations whose in-
come is taxed predominantly at a fixed rate. On the other hand, the
exercise would, to a large degree, be self-defeating. First, their charges
to members would no doubt be increased to offset the tax, and the
additional amounts would be deductible by the members as business
expenses; their own taxes would thus be reduced by about one-half
of the taxes paid by the organization. Second, as a more drastic re-
sponse, the organization could operate at or near its breakeven point,
generating little or no income to be taxed, and increasing its charges
to its members when necessary.
Viewed as an alternative to hypothetical charges that could be de-
ducted by its members, a business league's tax exemption, which covers
its investment income, is not without a plausible rationale. The prin-
cipal residual objection to the § 501(c)(6) exemption is that if large
reserves are currently being accumulated by the organization against
nebulous and distant future needs, its members are able to delay in-
come tax liability-and thus save the time value of the deferred taxes
-by taking immediate deductions for the league's future business ex-
penditures and by excluding from income the organization's endow-
ment income.
Conclusion
The exemption of nonprofit organizations from federal income taxa-
tion is neither a special privilege nor a hidden subsidy. Rather, it re-
flects the application of established principles of income taxation
160. See note 128 supra. But see Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. v. Commissioner,
135 F.2d 371 (7th Cir. 1943), involving an association organized by fire insurance com-
panies to test electrical products for safety, which was excluded both from § 501(c)(6)
(because it conducted a regular business) and § 501(c)(3) (because it was not a charitable,
scientific or educational organization, the only categories embraced by § 501(c)(3) for
tbe taxable years before the court); in 1954, organizations of this type were given
§ 501(c)(3) status by an amendment covering "testing for public safety."
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to organizations which, unlike the typical business corporation, do not
seek profit.
In these pages we have distinguished between public service or-
ganizations-institutions which channel the largesse of some individuals
in the interest of others-and mutual benefit organizations, whose main
purpose is to allow individuals to pool their income in order to spend
it more efficiently. Public service organizations do not produce income
which can easily be assimilated to the "profit" produced by a business
for the benefit of investors. Even if this inherent unsuitability of an in-
come tax were disregarded by imposing an arbitrary concept of "in-
come" on their financial activities, the burden of the tax would not
reflect the ability to pay of the individual beneficiaries.
The activities of mutual benefit organizations that consist simply
in the members' doing together what they could do separately without
income tax consequences (such as buying food or operating social fa-
cilities) are not fit objects of taxation. But such organizations may also
do business with nonmembers or invest in assets which produce in-
come inuring to the benefit of their members. There is no reason to
permit income of these types, which would be neither excludable nor
deductible from taxable income in the hands of an individual, to
escape taxation when acquired under the umbrella of an organization.
Frequently, however, the investment income of mutual benefit or-
ganizations would not be taxed if it were imputed to (or realized in
the first instance by) the group's members, because it is used to defray
expenses which the individuals would be entitled to deduct. One
example is the investment income of a labor union, used to pay ex-
penses serving the occupational interests of its members; another is
a trade association's investment income, used for business expenses
or to reduce the members' dues and assessments. In both cases, if
the investment income were imputed to (or realized by) the members,
they would be entitled to offsetting deductions under § 162. This is
why to tax such income would be in effect to penalize taxpaiyers for
doing together what they could do separately without being taxed.
In sum, mutual benefit organizations should be taxed only to the
extent of their investment income if such income would not be im-
mune from tax in the hands of their members, or to the extent they
do business with nonmembers in a way that produces something
akin to "profit."
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